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MUTUAL FUNDS, FAIRNESS, AND THE INCOME GAP

Samuel D. Brunson*
ABSTRACT

The rich, it turns out, are different from the rest of us. The wealthy, for
example, can assemble a diversified portfolio of securities or can invest
through hedge and private equity funds. When the rest of us invest, we do
so largely through mutual funds. Nearly half of American households own
mutual funds, and mutual funds represent a significant portion of the
financialassets held by U.S. households.
The tax rules governing mutual funds create an investment vehicle
with significantly worse tax treatment than investments available to the
wealthy. In particular, the tax rules governing mutual funds force
shareholdersto pay taxes on 'forced realizationincome" even though such
income does not increasetheir wealth.
Because mutual fund investors must pay taxes on non-existent gains,
but the wealthy can use alternative investment strategies to avoid such
taxes, the taxation of mutual funds violates the tax policy objective of
vertical equity. To correct the inequitiesfaced by mutualfund investors, the
tax law needs to permit low- and middle-income taxpayers to exclude from
their income 10% of the capitalgain dividends they receive each year.
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INTRODUCTION

The rich, it turns out, are different from the rest of us and not just
because they have more money.' They can invest in ways unavailable to
the average American. Many have pointed out the advantages of earning
capital gains, which make up a large percentage of wealthy Americans'
income, rather than ordinary wage income, which constitutes the majority
of the income earned by the rest of us. 2 Their advantages do not end,
however, at preferential capital gains rates. The vehicles available to
wealthy investors have tax advantages over the vehicles available to the
rest of us. 3
When the rest of us invest, we do so largely through mutual funds. In
fact, mutual funds were designed "for unsophisticated investors who cannot

1.
See Ernest Hemingway, The Snows of Kilimanjaro (19360, in THE SNOWS OF KILIMANJARO
AND OTHER STORIES 3, 23 (Charles Scribner's Sons 1955) ("He remembered poor Julian and his
romantic awe of them and how he had started a story once that began, 'The ... rich are different from
you and me.' And how some one had said to Julian, Yes, they have more money.").
2.
See, e.g., Paul Krugman, The Social Contract, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 23, 2011, at A35 ("[P]eople
with multimillion-dollar incomes, who typically derive much of that income from capital gains and
other sources that face low taxes, end up paying a lower overall tax rate than middle-class workers.").
3.
Such investments include hedge funds and private equity funds. Like mutual funds, they
provide investors with diversification, but often require a minimum initial investment of $1 million or
more. Samuel D. Brunson, Taxing Investment Fund Managers Using a Simplified Mark-to-Market
Approach, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 79, 84 (2010). As a result, such investments are simply outside
the reach of most households.
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assemble a diversified portfolio or evaluate the mutual fund's portfolio.'
About 44% of American households own mutual funds,5 far more than own
direct investments in stocks or bonds.6 In fact, in 2010, mutual funds
represented 23% of the financial assets held by U.S. households. Mutual
funds provide households with a relatively easy way to diversify their
assets. Moreover, the majority of U.S. households can afford to invest in
mutual funds: many mutual funds require a minimum investment of $500
or less. 8 As a result, mutual funds appeal largely to moderate-income
households. 9
With such a broad clientele, the mutual fund industry is understandably
enormous. At the end of 2010, U.S. mutual funds managed $13 trillion in
assets.10 That $13 trillion meant that mutual funds owned 29% of U.S.
companies' outstanding stock at the end of 201 1."
In light of their ubiquity and importance, a surprisingly small amount
of scholarship has examined the taxation of mutual funds. 12 Perhaps the
literature has neglected mutual funds because the tax law treats them as an
odd sort of hybrid: not corporations, exactly, but also not partnerships.
Instead, they function as a type of quasi-pass-through entity. 13 As a result

4.

Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 10, 20

(1991).

INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, 2012 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK 86 (52d ed.
5.
2011) [hereinafter ICI FACT BOOK], available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/2012_factbook.pdf.
6.
Alan R. Palmiter & Ahmed E. Taha, Mutual Fund Investors: Divergent Profiles, 2008 COLUM.
Bus. L. REV. 934, 941 (2008).
7.

ICI FACT BOOK, supra note 5, at 8.

8.
See Rob Wherry, Low Minimum Investments, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 13, 2007),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SBI19492483739091001.html ("We usually nix funds that require new
shareholders to pony up more than $5,000 when they first buy shares. This week, though, we reduced
that amount to just $500.").
Palmiter & Taha, supra note 6, at 941 ("[M]ost households that own mutual funds have
9.
moderate income and wealth.").
10.
ICI FACT BOOK, supra note 5, at 8.
11.
Id. at l2.
12.
For exceptions to this general lack of scholarly attention to the taxation of mutual funds, see
generally John C. Coates IV, Reforming the Taxation and Regulation of Mutual Funds: A Comparative
Legal and Economic Analysis, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 591 (2009); Mitchell L. Engler, A Missing Piece
to the Dividend Puzzle: Agency Costs of Mutual Funds, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 215, 216 (2003) (arguing
that mutual fund advisors ignore tax consequences to mutual fund investors); John Morley, Collective
Branding and the Origins ofInvestment Fund Regulation, 6 VA. L. & Bus. REV. 341 (2012); Shawn P.
Travis, The Accelerated and Uneconomic Bearing of Tax Burdens by Mutual Fund Shareholders, 55
TAX LAW. 819, 819 (2002) (addressing tax differences between mutual fund investors and direct
investors).
See Samuel D. Brunson, Repatriating Tax-Exempt Investments: Tax Havens, Blocker
13.
Corporations, and Unrelated Debt-Financed Income, 106 Nw. U. L. REV. 225, 242 (2012) ("Although
not true pass-through entities for tax purposes, the tax treatment of mutual funds eliminates the second
level of taxation and treats them as quasi-pass-through entities.").
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of this status, mutual funds generally do not pay an entity-level tax as long
as they meet stringent rules.14
The unique rules applicable to mutual funds comprise approximately
seven sections of the Internal Revenue Code," and these rules generally do
not play out on the larger canvas of entity taxation. Because of their unique
nature, though, the tax law governing mutual funds demands a closer look.
With about 52.3 million households owning mutual funds,16 these few
sections of the tax law have a significant impact on the economic life of
Americans. As a result of mutual funds tax rules, shareholders must pay
taxes on "forced realization income" even though such income does not
increase their wealth.
Because most mutual fund shareholders have moderate income,"7 these
additional tax costs fall most heavily on low- and middle-class taxpayers.
The rich do not have to bear these tax costs because they have access to
alternative investment strategies, strategies that are not bounded by the tax
rules applicable to mutual funds and are generally inaccessible to poorer
households. Because mutual fund investors must pay taxes on non-existent
gains, but the wealthy can use alternative investment strategies to avoid
such taxes, the taxation of mutual funds violates the tax policy objective of
vertical equity.' 8 To remedy the vertical equity problem, this Article
proposes that, in certain circumstances, low- and middle-income taxpayers
be permitted to exclude from their income 10% of the "capital gain
dividends"' 9 they receive each year.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II explains the advantageous tax
treatment of mutual funds and what funds must do to qualify for such
treatment. Part III discusses some of the consequences of the mutual fund
tax rules for shareholders and compares the tax treatment of mutual fund
shareholders and other types of investors. Part IV looks at these differences
through the lenses of fairness and vertical equity. Finding the treatment
unfair and inequitable, Part V then discusses how an exemption of part of a
shareholder's capital gain dividend would improve the fairness and vertical
equity of the tax law and provides a detailed explanation of how the
exemption should be designed.
14.
See I.R.C. § 11(a) (2006) (imposing tax on taxable income of corporations).
15.
I.R.C. §§ 851-855, 860, 4982.
ICI FACT BOOK, supra note 5, at 70.
16.
17.
About 25% of households that own mutual funds have annual incomes of less than $50,000;
62% have income of less than $100,000. Id. at 89.
18.
Vertical equity considerations underlie the decision to include progressivity in tax rates; put
simply, vertical equity concerns hold that taxpayers with a greater ability to pay should pay more in
taxes. C. EUGENE STEUERLE, CONTEMPORARY U.S. TAX POLICY II (2d ed. 2008).
19.
A "capital gain dividend" is that portion of a mutual fund's dividend that corresponds to the
mutual fund's net capital gain for the year, and that the fund designates as a capital gain dividend.
I.R.C. § 852(b)(3)(C).
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I. TAX TREATMENT OF MUTUAL FUNDS

A. Entity Taxation
In general, the tax law categorizes business entities as either
corporations or partnerships. 20 The tax regime applicable to corporations
differs significantly from that applicable to partnerships. In general, a
corporation pays taxes on its income at a top marginal rate of 35%.21 The
corporation's shareholders, however, do not pay taxes on corporate income;
rather, if and when the corporation pays a dividend, shareholders must
include the dividend in their gross income and pay taxes on it.22 Although
corporate dividends are ordinary income, and historically have been taxed
at a shareholder's marginal rate, under current law, qualifying dividends
are taxed at a top rate of 15%.23
Unlike corporations, partnerships do not pay taxes.24 Instead, the tax
law treats partners as if they had directly earned their share of the
partnership's income;2s both the amount and the character of the
partnership's income pass through to its partners.26 As a result, partnerships
escape the double taxation that applies to corporations. However, where
shareholders do not pay taxes on corporate income until they receive it as a
dividend, partners cannot defer their payment of taxes. They include their
share of partnership income on their tax return for the year the partnership
earns that income, whether or not they receive a distribution of that income
from the partnership. 27
The double taxation of corporate shareholders can be illustrated as
follows: Assume that John owns 10% of the shares of XYZ Inc. In 2012,
XYZ Inc. had $1,000 of taxable income. XYZ Inc. paid $350 in taxes, 28 but
John had no tax liability in 2012 as a result of his ownership of XYZ.
However, in 2013, XYZ Inc. distributes $650 to its shareholders. John
20.
Treas. Reg. §301.7701-2(a) (as amended in 2011) ("A business entity with two or more
members is classified for federal tax purposes as either a corporation or a partnership.").
I.R.C. § 11(b)(1)(D).
21.
I.R.C. § 301(c)(1).
22.
"Qualified dividend income" is eligible to be taxed at the rate applicable to long-term capital
23.
gains. I.R.C. § 1(h)(1 1).
24.
I.R.C. § 701 ("A partnership as such shall not be subject to the income tax imposed by this
chapter.").
25.
Id. §702(a).
Id. § 702(b).
26.
Treas. Reg. § 1.702-1(a) (as amended in 2005).
27.
28.
Actually, because corporate tax rates are graduated, a corporation with only $1,000 in income
would not pay taxes at a 35% rate. I.R.C. § 11(b). Arguably such graduated rates are inequitable,
subject to abuse, and should be repealed in any event. See Jeffrey L. Kwall, The Repeal of Graduated
Corporate Tax Rates, 131 TAX NOTES 1395, 1397 (2011). For simplicity's sake, I will ignore the
graduated corporate tax rates and treat all corporate income as if it were subject to the top rate of 35%.
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receives $65 as his share of the dividend. Provided the dividend qualifies as
"qualified dividend income"and John pays taxes on long-term capital gains
at a 15% rate, he will pay about $9.75 in taxes. Of the $100 of corporate
pre-tax income allocable to John's shares, John will end up with $55.25
after taxes.
If XYZ were instead a partnership, XYZ would pay no taxes on its
receipt of $1,000 in 2012. Instead, John would pay taxes on his 10%
distributive share in 2012. If the partnership's income was ordinary income
and John paid taxes at the top marginal rate, he would owe $35 in taxes in
2012 whether or not he received his $100 from the partnership. At some
point, the partnership would presumably distribute John's $100 to him, at
which point he would have no additional tax liability. After taxes, John
would have $65 of the $100 of partnership income allocable to his
partnership interest.
The double taxation of corporate income-once at the corporate level,
then again when distributed to shareholders-concerns many policymakers.
They argue that this double taxation distorts investors' choices,
incentivizing them to shift their investments from corporate equity to
lower-taxed investments, thus eroding the corporate tax base. 2 9 And, in
fact, data indicates that economic activity by pass-through entities has
increased much more rapidly than economic activity by taxable
corporations.30
The distortions caused by the double taxation of corporate profits do
not limit themselves to investors, however. Double taxation also affects
how corporations raise money. A corporation pays taxes on its income and,
to the extent it pays that income out to shareholders as a dividend, the
shareholders owe taxes on their dividends while the corporation gets no
deduction for dividends paid.3 ' But corporations have other paths available
for raising capital besides issuing equity-corporations can borrow money.
Borrowing eliminates the double taxation problem; even though lenders
pay taxes on interest income at ordinary rates, "[i]ncome from debtfinanced corporate investment ... is largely untaxed at the corporate level
because corporations may deduct interest payments."32
In spite of the inefficiencies of, and distortions caused by, the corporate
income tax, lawmakers have neither eliminated it nor fully integrated it
29.
See, e.g., THE PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL ON FEDERAL TAX REFORM, SIMPLE, FAIR, AND
PRO-GROWTH: PROPOSALS TO Fix AMERICA'S TAX SYSTEM 99 (2005) [hereinafter ADVISORY PANEL,

PROPOSALS] ("The double tax on corporate earnings ... discourages investments in corporate equity in
favor of other investments that are not taxed as heavily.").
30.
See Heather M. Field, Checking in on "Check-the-Box ", 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 451, 493-94
(2009).
31.
Eric M. Zolt, Corporate Taxation After the Tax Reform Act of 1986: A State of
Disequilibrium,66 N.C. L. REV. 839, 860 (1988).
32.
ADVISORY PANEL, PROPOSALS, supranote 29, at 99.
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with the individual income tax. In fact, lawmakers have worked to prevent
the erosion of the corporate tax base through taxpayer self-help.33 Most
notably, in 1987, Congress passed the publicly traded partnership rules. 34
Congress worried that corporations would yield to the pressure to
disincorporate and avoid a second level of taxation. 3 5 To relieve this
pressure, Congress prevented certain partnerships from enjoying the
benefits of pass-through taxation. The publicly traded partnership rules
provide that the tax law will treat certain partnerships as if they were
corporations.36 By preventing certain entities from enjoying pass-through
treatment, Congress could maintain a certain level of corporate tax
revenues.37
B. Quasi-Pass-Throughs
Notwithstanding its desire to preserve the corporate tax base, Congress
created and has maintained a special taxing regime applicable to mutual
funds. A mutual fund that meets certain requirements can elect to be taxed
as a "regulated investment company."3 8 Like a partnership, these electing
mutual funds can avoid paying an entity-level tax, but mutual fund
shareholders do not get full pass-through treatment. Instead, mutual funds
inhabit the world of quasi-pass-throughs. 3 9
To qualify for the special tax treatment, a mutual fund must be a
domestic corporation.40 As such, it pays taxes at the applicable corporate

Cf Zolt, supra note 31, at 875 ("Tolerating self-help integration, however, is hardly a rational
33.
approach to the problems created by the imbalance in the corporate tax system.").
34.
Rebecca S. Rudnick, Who Should Pay the Corporate Tax in a Flat Tax World?, 39 CASE W.
RES. L. REv. 965, 977 (1989).
Id. ("Congress expanded the scope of the corporate tax system by including publicly traded
35.
partnerships among the firms taxed as corporations, in order to relieve the presumed pressure to
disincorporate.") (internal footnote omitted).
I.R.C. § 7704(a) (2006).
36.
37.
There may be defensible reasons in addition to raising revenue to hesitate from fully
integrating the corporate and individual income taxes. Professor Jeffrey Kwall argues, for example,
"that equity and efficiency may be better served" by maintaining a corporate income tax, which
provides sufficient government revenue while allowing the government to keep individual tax rates
lower. Jeffrey L. Kwall, The Uncertain Case Against the Double Taxation of CorporateIncome, 68
N.C. L. REv. 613, 618 (1990).
38.
I.R.C. §851(b). The I.R.C. does not ever refer to "mutual funds"; the rules discussed in this
Article technically apply only to regulated investment companies. Nonetheless, for simplicity's sake,
this Article will refer to mutual funds rather than regulated investment companies. Moreover, because
the tax law does not distinguish between closed-end and open-end funds, this Article will refer to both
as "mutual funds."
Quasi-pass-through entities include not only mutual funds, but also certain other passive
39.
investment vehicles, including real estate investments trusts and real estate mortgage investment
conduits. Joseph M. Dodge & Jay A. Soled, Debunking the Basis Myth Under the Income Tax, 81 IND.
L.J. 539, 584 n.237 (2006).
40.
I.R.C. § 851(a).
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rates just like ordinary domestic corporations. 4 1 However, a mutual fund
pays taxes based on its "investment company taxable income.'A2 A mutual
fund calculates its investment company taxable income in a manner similar
to a corporation's calculation of its taxable income, but with several
differences.4 3 The most significant difference is that a qualifying mutual
fund can deduct the dividends it pays as it determines its investment
company taxable income.4 Like corporate shareholders, and unlike
investors in pass-through entities, mutual fund shareholders pay taxes on
the dividends they receive in the year they receive the dividends, not
necessarily the year the mutual fund earned the income. However, to
preserve the feel of pass-through taxation, mutual fund shareholders pay
taxes at the preferential long-term capital gain rates on the portion of their
dividend attributable to the mutual fund's net capital gains and qualified
*
*45
dividend *income.
Mutual funds' dividends-paid deduction essentially eliminates
corporate double taxation. Assume that, instead of a partnership or ordinary
corporation, XYZ is a qualifying mutual fund. In 2012 it earned $1,000 of
income. On December 31, 2012, it paid a dividend of $1,000 to its
shareholders. John received $100 as his share of XYZ's dividend. In
calculating its income, XYZ had a deduction of $1,000 that it used to offset
its $1,000 of income. As a result, XYZ had no investment company taxable
income for 2012, and no tax liability. John had to include his $100 dividend
in his income and pay taxes on that $100. As with a partnership, XYZ's
income faced only one level of taxation.
Why provide mutual fund investors with this single level of taxation?
On the surface, it allows mutual fund shareholders to face tax consequences
similar to those that would apply if they invested directly in the mutual
fund's underlying portfolio. If they invested directly in the securities that
their mutual fund holds, they would pay taxes only on dividends they
received and gains from the sale of those securities. The imposition of an
intermediary should not disadvantage investors, especially where the
intermediary is necessary for those investors to achieve portfolio
diversification. 4 6

41.
Id. §852(b)(1).
42.
Id.
43.
Id. § 852(b)(2).
44.
Compare § 852(b)(1), with §852(b)(2)(D). See also § 852(b)(2)(A) (stating that mutual funds
also do not include their net capital gain in their calculation of taxable income).
45.
§ 852(b)(3)(B).
46.
See infra notes 58-64 and accompanying text.
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C. Qualifying as a Quasi-Pass-Through
To enjoy the benefits of this quasi-pass-through tax regime, the tax law
places certain restrictions and obligations on mutual funds. These
restrictions and obligations fall into three broad categories: an
administrative requirement, an income-and-assets requirement, and a
distribution requirement. The administrative requirement is relatively easy
to meet. Under it, a mutual fund must be organized as a corporation,
register under the Investment Company Act of 1940 (the 1940 Act), and
file an election with the IRS.47 Though administrative, this registration
under the 1940 Act creates real obligations for and imposes significant
regulation on a mutual fund. 8
The income-and-assets requirement substantively affects a mutual
fund's day-to-day activities. The income side of this requirement says that
at least 90% of a mutual fund's income must derive from specified sources,
including dividends, interest, foreign currency, gains on the sale of
securities, and other income related to its investment in securities.4 9 A
mutual fund cannot derive more than 10% of its income from other sources,
including active businesses and commodities.
Along with limitations on the types of income they can earn, mutual
funds also face limitations on the types of assets they can own. Broadly
speaking, the asset requirement mirrors the income requirement (that is,
mutual funds can own the types of assets that produce qualifying income),
but serves a different purpose than the income side of the requirement. Half
of a mutual fund's assets must consist of cash, government securities, and
other securities.5 1 However, no single issuer in this "other securities"
category can make up more than 5% of the value of the mutual fund's
portfolio, and the mutual fund cannot own more than 10% of the voting
stock of any single issuer. 52 Although these specific restrictions apply to
only half of a mutual fund's assets, mutual funds are prohibited from
investing more than 25% of the total value of their assets in one issuer or in
two or more issuers in the same trade or business. 53
Where the income side of this requirement forces mutual funds to
invest in select passive assets, the asset side forces them to diversify. A

47.
I.R.C. § 851(a)(1).
48.
See Coates, supra note 12, at 621 ("The [1940 Act] is heavily proscriptive. It requires and
forbids numerous actions in the operation of regulated funds."). The registration requirement is,
however, beyond the scope of this Article.
49.
I.R.C. § 851(b)(2).
Id.
50.
51.
Id. § 851(b)(3)(A).
Id.
52.
53.
Id. § 851(b)(3)(B).
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mutual fund cannot be overly exposed to a single company, or even a
single trade or business.54 At the same time, it faces significant limitations
on its ability to hold a majority share in companies. 5 Instead, to qualify as
a quasi-pass-through, it must invest passively and in a diversified manner.
Finally, mutual funds face a distribution requirement. To qualify for the
dividends-paid deduction, every year a mutual fund must pay dividends
constituting at least 90% of its investment company taxable income to
shareholders. Generally, however, mutual funds will distribute far more
of their income. If a mutual fund distributes less than 98% of its ordinary
income and 98.2% of its capital gain income during the year, it must pay a
4% excise tax on such shortfall.s? Effectively, then, every year a mutual
fund distributes all of its income to its shareholders.
II. THE MIDDLE CLASS AND MUTUAL FUND TAXATION

Mutual funds provide investors with "the benefits of professional
investment advice, asset management, and risk diversification."58 However,
they do so in a relatively affordable manner-the minimum required
investment to purchase a mutual fund is typically around $1,000.59 Hedge
funds, on the other hand, often require minimum initial investments of $1
million, making hedge fund investments impossible for any but the richest
individuals.6 0 Similarly, to invest directly in a diversified portfolio of stocks
and bonds similar to that provided by a mutual fund, an investor would
need enough money in savings and no immediate need to spend that
money. Mutual funds, on the other hand, provide their shareholders with
exposure to a large basket of stocks. 6 1 By pooling the investments of their
thousands of shareholders, and providing shareholders with proportionate
exposure to each of the stocks, mutual funds allow even an investor with
limited assets to enjoy the benefits of broad diversification. Moreover, in
addition to the expense of assembling a diversified portfolio, managing

54.
Id. § 851(b)(3).
55.
Id.
56.
Id. § 852(a)(1).
57.
Id. § 4982 (amended 2010).
58.
Consuelo L. Kertz & Paul J. Simko, Mutual Fund Investing and Tax Uncertainty: The Need
for New Disclosures,7 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 103, 103 (2001).
59.
INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, The Difference Between Mutual Funds and Hedge Funds
(April 2007), available at http://www.ici.org/files/ci.faqshedge.print (last visited Sept. 30, 2013).
60.
Vikas Agarwal et al., Hedge Fundsfor Retail Investors? An Examination of Hedged Mutual
Funds, 44 J. FIN. & QUANT. ANALYSIS 273, 274 (2009). In fact, mutual funds that use hedge fund
strategies and attempt to replicate their returns often have a minimum investment of only $5,000. Id.
See Marcin Kacperczyk et al., On the Industry Concentration of Actively Managed Equity
61.
Mutual Funds, 55 J. FIN. 1983, 1987 (2005) (stating that actively managed equity mutual funds own a
median of sixty-five stocks).
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such a portfolio would require significant knowledge and time
commitments that an individual investor may not have.
As a result, mutual funds understandably attract "the least sophisticated
members of the investing public."6 2 Their benefits largely accrue to the
middle class; the majority of mutual fund shareholders have household
incomes of less than $100,000, and a quarter have household incomes of
less than $50,000.63 The wealthy can afford to pay someone to manage
their portfolios,64 make the minimum investment in a hedge fund, and have
access to other methods of diversification, while the middle class cannot.
Congress intended for mutual funds to have this middle class focus.
Under the Revenue Act of 1926, the government taxed "associations, jointstock companies, and insurance companies" as corporations. Though this
threatened to tax investment trusts (the precursors to modern mutual funds)
as corporations rather than treating them as untaxed pass-through entities,
investment trusts relied on case law that provided that a trust "would not be
separately taxed as a corporation if it was not carrying on a business."66
Until 1935, such trusts claimed that managing a passive investment
portfolio did not rise to the level of carrying on a business. But then, in
Morrissey v. Commissioner, the Supreme Court held that an investment
trust was an association carrying on a business. 6 8 As such, it was subject to
entity-level taxation.
Taxing mutual funds made them much more expensive; had that rule
persisted, the middle and lower classes would not have had access to
affordable diversification or investment management. To give these
investors access to affordable investments, Congress created the quasipass-through regime to return mutual funds to their pre-1935 tax status.69
A. Mutual Funds and ForcedRealization Income
In spite of the fact that qualifying mutual funds do not face an entitylevel tax, mutual fund investments face heavier taxation than non-mutual
fund investments. This higher taxation results largely from mutual funds'
62.

Martin J. Aronstein, The Decline and Fall of the Stock Certificate in America, 1 J. COMP.

CoRP'. L. & SEC. REG. 273, 279 (1978).
See ICI FACT BOOK, supranote 5, at 89.
63.
64.
See Mark J. Roe, PoliticalElements in the Creationofa Mutual FundIndustry, 139 U. PA. L.
REv. 1469, 1483 (1991).
65.
Revenue Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-20, §2(a)(2), 44 Stat. 9, 9.
Roe, supranote 64, at 1481.
66.
67.
Morrissey v. Comn'r, 296 U.S. 344, 348-49 (1935).
68.
Id. at 360.
69.
Roe, supranote 64, at 1483 ("Tax doctrine was reconciled with the goal of giving the middleclass collective access to professional investment management by returning to the view that picking a
fragmented portfolio was not really a business after all.").
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distribution obligations, combined with the fact that the law requires
mutual funds to redeem a shareholder's shares within a week of receiving
her redemption request.70
Unless it has sufficient cash reserves, a mutual fund generally must sell
some of its securities when it decides to pay a dividend or when
shareholders request redemption.7 ' Moreover, to the extent the mutual fund
realizes a gain on the sale, it increases its net capital gain by that amount.7 2
This, in turn, increases the capital gain dividend it must pay to avoid entitylevel taxation. Though shareholders will pay taxes on the increased
distribution at long-term capital gains rates, 74 this larger dividend does not
increase its remaining shareholders' wealth. While shareholders have
additional cash as a result of the dividend, the increase in their cash
corresponds with a decrease in the net asset value of the fund. In essence,
any time a mutual fund has to sell securities to pay dividends or meet its
redemption requirement, it can create taxable income for its shareholders
without creating any concomitant value for them.
To some extent, the tax law permits mutual funds to shield their
shareholders from this phantom taxable income as it relates to dividends.
Mutual funds can provide their shareholders with the option to have their
dividends reinvested in the fund's shares rather than paid in cash. As long
as shareholders could have received the dividends as cash, the reinvestment
will count toward the 90% and 98% distribution requirements.7 As a
result, if all of a mutual fund's shareholders elect the fund's dividend
reinvestment plan, the fund does not have to sell any shares to pay its
dividends. It only has to issue new shares, and that issuance does not create
phantom taxable income for its shareholders.76

70.
See Robert C. Illig, What Hedge Funds Can Teach Corporate America: A Roadmap for
Achieving Institutional Investor Oversight, 57 AM. U. L. REv. 225, 294 ("Open-end mutual
funds . . . must be ready to redeem their shares on a daily basis and to pay redeeming shareholders
within seven days of receiving a request.").
71.
See, e.g., Jason T. Greene & Charles W. Hodges, The Dilution Impact of Daily Fund Flows
on Open-End Mutual Funds, 65 J. FIN. ECON. 131, 131-32 (2002) ("The fund itself must either engage
in costly trade or alter its cash position in response to mutual fund traders' exchanges.").
72.
I.R.C. § 1222(11) (2006).
73.
Id. § 852(b)(3)(A).
74.
Id. § 852(b)(3)(B).
75.
Technically, the process works like this: to qualify as a regulated investment company, at
least 90% of a mutual fund's investment company taxable income must qualify for the deduction for
dividends paid. Id. § 852(a)(1). To qualify for the deduction, the dividend must constitute "property"
under I.R.C. §301. Id. §§ 562(a), 316(a). For these purposes, the tax law generally does not treat a
corporation's distribution of its own shares as a distribution of property. Id. § 305(a). If, however, the
distribution can be paid either in property or in the corporation's own stock, and shareholders can elect
whether they want to receive property or stock, a distribution of stock will qualify as a dividend. Id.
§ 305(b)(1); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.305-l(b)(2) (amended 1993), 1.305-2(b), Ex. 2 (amended 1973).
Even if all shareholders elect to reinvest their dividends, though, their reinvested dividends
76.
are still taxable.
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A mutual fund cannot require its shareholders to choose the dividend
reinvestment plan, though. Presumably, then, mutual funds will have to pay
some amount of their dividends in cash each year. Moreover, mutual funds
have no similar way to limit the phantom taxable income that arises for
remaining shareholders when a different shareholder redeems her shares.
Imagine a mutual fund with three shareholders. Each purchases a share of
the mutual fund for $10; the fund then invests the $30 in three shares of
ABC stock.n After one year, ABC has not paid a dividend, but the value of
its stock has increased from $10 to $15. However, in spite of the increase in
value of its assets, the mutual fund has not realized any income and has no
distribution requirement. Because of its increased net asset value, though,
the mutual fund's shares are now worth $15 each. If one of the mutual
fund's shareholders decides to redeem her shares, the mutual fund must
buy it back for $15. To do so, the mutual fund will sell one ABC share and
the redeeming shareholder will have $5 of long-term capital gain.78
The economic position of the remaining two shareholders does not
change as a result of the exiting shareholder. Their tax liabilities, however,
do. When the mutual fund sold the share of ABC stock, it, too, realized a
$5 long-term capital gain. To qualify for its tax-advantaged status and to
avoid an excise tax, it must distribute that gain to its shareholders;
therefore, it will pay a dividend of $2.50 per share to the remaining two
shareholders. Its net asset value will drop from $30 to $25, and the
shareholders will each have a mutual fund share worth $12.50 and cash
worth $2.50. However, they must include the $2.50 in their gross income
and pay taxes on it. Notwithstanding the fact the dividend did nothing to
improve the economic condition of the remaining shareholders, the tax
rules governing mutual funds created a tax liability for them.
A wealthy investor can avoid this "forced realization income." No tax
liability would exist if she invested directly in the underlying portfolio of
securities. The realization rule requires that she sell her securities before
she owes tax on the gains. 79 As long as the investor continues to hold her
securities, others' purchases and sales of securities-even securities
identical to those the investor holds-will not affect her tax liability. The

77.
For simplicity's sake, I will ignore the mutual fund diversification requirements for purposes
of this hypothetical.
78.
She has a basis of $10 in her share, and she realizes $15. As a result, her gain is $5. I.R.C.
§ 1001(a). Because her mutual fund share is a capital asset that she has held for longer than one year,
her gain is long-term capital. Id. §§ 1221, 1222.
79.
Id. § 1001(a); see also Jeffrey L. Kwall, When Should Asset Appreciation Be Taxed?: The
Case for a Disposition Standard of Realization, 86 IND. L.J. 77, 79 (2011) ("The U.S. income
tax . .. has always embraced a realization requirement, thereby deferring the taxation of asset
appreciation until the occurrence of a realization event (normally, a sale or exchange of the appreciated
property).").

152

Alabama Law Review

[Vol. 65:1:139

investor would only be subject to taxation when she received dividends and
when she sold her shares.
Hedge fund investors, on the other hand, seem to face the same forced
realization income problem as mutual fund investors. Although most hedge
funds limit their investors' ability to redeem,o ultimately, hedge fund
investors can sell their interests back to the fund at net asset value. Like
mutual funds, if hedge funds do not have sufficient cash to redeem their
investors, they must sell securities to get the cash. Because hedge funds are
treated as partnerships for tax purposes, hedge fund investors must pay
taxes on their share of hedge funds' gains.8 ' Moreover, unlike mutual
funds, where shareholders can demand that their dividends be paid in cash,
hedge funds have no obligation to distribute gains to their investors. 82 In
this instance, hedge funds appear at least as expensive as mutual funds for
tax purposes.
Hedge funds can avoid allocating this forced realization income to their
remaining partners, though. Partnerships do not have to allocate gains in a
strictly pro rata manner; provided their allocations have substantial
economic effect, the partnership agreement determines each partner's
distributive share. With this flexibility, many hedge fund agreements
include a "stuffing" allocation.84
When a hedge fund investor redeems her shares, the hedge fund pays
her an amount equal to the shares' net asset value. Without a stuffing
allocation, the investor pays taxes on the difference between the amount
she receives and her basis in her hedge fund interest.85 She treats the
redemption proceeds as capital gain.86 Because the hedge fund had to sell
securities to fund the redemption proceeds, however, it would need to
allocate to the remaining shareholders their share of the gains, and they
would owe taxes on those gains.
With a stuffing allocation, the hedge fund can allocate the realized gain
to the departing partner immediately before her departure so that her basis
in her interests equals the fair market value of those interests. Now she
Often, hedge funds require investors to provide advance notice to redeem their interests, as
80.
well as only permit redemptions on certain dates or limit the total percentage of the fund that it will
redeem at any given redemption date, or both. See, e.g., Investor Protection Implications of Hedge
Funds: Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. 2 (2003) (testimony of
William H. Donaldson, Chairman, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission). These restrictions
severely limit the liquidity of hedge fund interests.
Alan L. Kennard, The Hedge Fund Versus the Mutual Fund,57 TAX LAW. 133, 142 (2003).
81.
82.
Id.
I.R.C. § 704(a), (b)(2).
83.
Brian E. Ladin, James M. Lowy & William S. Woods II, Hedge FundStuffing Allocations: A
84.
Path Through the Maze, 121 TAx NOTES 925, 926 (2008).
I.R.C. §73 1(a).
85.
86.
Id.
87.
Ladin, Lowy & Woods, supra note 84, at 926.
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owes no taxes on the redemption proceeds because her basis is the same as
her redemption proceeds. However, she owes taxes on the realized gains
that the fund allocated to her. 8 Because the amount she includes in gross
income and the character of the income is identical either way, the stuffing
provision does not increase the withdrawing partner's tax liability, thus
leaving her indifferent to its existence. But because the realized gains are
allocated away from the remaining partners, the remaining partners owe no
taxes as a result of the withdrawal of the partner. They can thus avoid
paying taxes on forced realization income in a way that mutual fund
investors cannot.89 The flexibility of partnership taxation provides better
tax treatment for wealthy investors than other investors can achieve.
B. Other Tax DisadvantagesofMutual Funds
In addition to paying taxes on forced realization income, mutual fund
shareholders face issues of tax overhang and the inability of losses to flow
through mutual funds. Tax overhang may cause a mutual fund shareholder
to owe taxes on gains from which she will never benefit. Mutual funds
must pay dividends at least annually, 90 and each taxable mutual fund
shareholder must pay taxes on any distributions she receives. 9 1 A potential
shareholder can purchase her shares whenever she wants, which means that
she may accidentally buy into a tax overhang. That is, a shareholder owes
taxes on her share of the mutual fund's distribution whether she has been a
shareholder for one day or one year. When she buys a share of the fund,
however, she buys it at net asset value. 92 But if she purchases her share the
day before a dividend, part of the share's net asset value includes the
following day's distribution.93 When she receives the dividend, the value of
her share will drop by the amount of the dividend. But even though the

88.
Id.
89.
It is worth noting that, although not unusual, stuffing allocations are controversial. Critics
argue that these allocations lack substantial economic effect. See, e.g., Joseph DiSciullo, IRS, Treasury
Focused on "Stuffing Allocations," Officials Say, 125 TAx NOTES 67, 67 (2009). If they have no
substantial economic effect, the partnership agreement must be ignored and, instead, gains must be
allocated according to partners' interest in the partnership. I.R.C. § 704(b). If stuffing allocations do not
work, investors who stay in hedge funds face the same tax disadvantages as investors who stay in
mutual funds when another investor withdraws.
90.
1.R.C. § 852(a)(1).
91.
See, e.g., I.R.C. § 852(b)(3)(A).
92.
Jerry W. Markham, Mutual Fund Scandals-A Comparative Analysis of the Role of
Corporate Governance in the Regulation of Collective Investments, 3 HASTINGs Bus. L.J. 67, 74
(2006).
Kertz & Simko, supranote 58, at 110.
93.
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dividend only constitutes a return of capital to the new shareholder, she
must nonetheless pay taxes on her receipt of the dividend. 9 4
The tax law treats mutual fund shareholders worse than other
diversified investors with respect to losses. Generally, an individual can
deduct her losses on the sale of securities against her capital gains, plus
$3,000 of ordinary income. If her capital losses exceed her capital gains,
she can carry the losses forward until she can use them.
An investor who directly owns securities can use her capital loss
deductions to reduce her taxable income. To the extent she has capital
losses, she uses them to offset her capital gains for the year. And to the
extent her losses exceed her gains for a year, she carries them forward until
she can use them. Similarly, capital losses pass through partnerships,
allowing partners to deduct such losses, not only against the gains that pass
through the partnership, but against any capital gains they have during the
year.
Capital losses do not, however, pass through mutual funds. Instead, the
mutual fund uses its capital losses to offset its capital gains in calculating
its investment company taxable income. To the extent that a mutual fund's
capital losses exceed its capital gains, it carries those losses forward. 97 This
means, effectively, that if an individual owns one share each of two mutual
funds and one ends the year with a $10 per share capital loss, while the
other ends the year with a $5 per share capital gain, the first mutual fund's
net asset value will fall by $10, and it will not pay a dividend, while the
second mutual fund will pay a dividend of $5. The shareholder will owe
taxes on the $5 dividend, and the $10 loss from her other investment will
not offset her obligation, even though she has a net loss on her
investments. 98 Moreover, an individual with a net capital loss can deduct it
against up to $3,000 if she held the securities directly or through a
partnership. 99 A mutual fund, however, cannot deduct its capital losses

94.
Id. Assume that she purchased a share of the mutual fund for $10. The next day, the fund paid
a dividend of $1 per share. The shareholder would now have a mutual fund share worth $9 and $1
cash-or, if she received the dividend pursuant to a dividend reinvestment plan, she would have $10
worth of shares in the mutual fund-but she would still owe taxes on the $1 she received. Id.
I.R.C. § 1211(b).
95.
Id. § 1212(b)(1).
96.
97.
Id. § l212(a)(3)(A).
While these tax consequences are worse than she would face if she owned the securities
98.
directly or through a partnership, they could be even worse. Prior to the Regulated Investment Company
Modernization Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-325 (2010), a mutual fund could only carry the loss
forward for up to eight years following the loss year. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 111TH
CONG., TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF H.R. 4337, THE "REGULATED INVESTMENT COMPANY
MODERNIZATION ACT OF 2010," FOR CONSIDERATION ON THE FLOOR OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES 3 (Comm. Print 2010).

99.

Id.
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against ordinary income.o00 Unlike wealthy investors, then, mutual fund
investors are limited as to their ability to fully take advantage of their
losses.
C. There Is No Policy Reason Underlying These Inequities

Though it appears inequitable, the additional tax cost to mutual fund
investors could be justified if it resulted from some additional benefit to the
investors. There is no evidence, however, that Congress deliberately
introduced these additional tax costs as the price of investing in mutual
funds. Rather, the rules tried to "put[] fund shareholders on a par with
direct investors in securities . . . to ensure that a mutual fund would be an

investment company, rather than an operating company."'o Secondarily,
Congress wanted to protect investors from overly risky bets. 102 Mutual
funds themselves may have agreed to this regulation to bolster the public's
confidence in the mutual fund industry.' 0 3 The additional tax costs of
mutual funds, as compared with direct portfolio investment, do not advance
Congress's principal purpose in enacting the mutual fund tax rules. Rather,
it violates that purpose: the additional tax cost reduces the similarity
between direct investment and indirect investment through mutual funds.
Similarly, none of these tax costs affect the secondary purposes of reducing
risk or otherwise functioning to bolster public confidence in mutual funds.
Moreover, to the extent that mutual fund shareholders should pay for
the benefits afforded by mutual fund taxation, there is no reason they
should pay through higher tax costs. Mutual fund shareholders already pay
a variety of fees to invest in mutual funds.104 To the extent that mutual fund
shareholders pay to enjoy the benefits of the mutual fund form, these fees,
rather than additional tax cost, constitute that cost. Rules that create
additional tax cost may be justifiable when they serve a compelling
purpose. But where the additional cost serves no purpose, or the purpose
could better be accomplished through other means, the tax rules should be
changed.

100.
I.R.C. § 1211(a).
101.
Matthew P. Fink, The Revenue Act of 1936: The Most Important Event in the History of the
Mutual FundIndustry, 84 FiN. HIST. 16, 17-18 (2005).
102.
Id. at 18.
103,
See Morley, supra note 12, at 380 ("The industry sought regulation to ensure that the
industry presented a simple and standardized set of options to the investing public.").
104.
Mutual fund shareholders may directly pay sales charges on purchasing shares. In addition,
the mutual fund pays its investment advisor 12b-1 fees and fund servicing and operating expenses.
Shareholders indirectly bear these costs. See John Howat & Linda Reid, Compensation Practicesfor
Retail Sale ofMutual Funds: The Need for Transparencyand Disclosure, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN.
L. 685, 687 (2007).
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III. MUTUAL FUND SHAREHOLDERS FACE AN INEQUITABLE TAx BURDEN
As discussed above, the current tax treatment of mutual fund investors
is worse than the treatment of direct portfolio investors and investors in
private investment funds. 0 5 Traditional tax policy evaluates fairness using
two principles: horizontal and vertical equity. 06 Horizontal equity holds
that similarly situated persons should face approximately the same tax
burden.'0 7 Vertical equity, on the other hand, "means that taxpayers with
higher incomes should pay tax at higher rates." 08 While vertical equity
considerations generally underlie the tax law's progressivity in general, we
can also scrutinize individual provisions and regimes to evaluate whether
those provisions meet the norm of vertical equity.' 09
The current tax treatment of mutual fund investors clearly meets the
horizontal equity standard. All mutual fund investors pay taxes on their
share of the fund's income for the year, unless they hold their mutual fund
shares through a tax-advantaged retirement account."o But satisfying
horizontal equity concerns without also satisfying vertical equity concerns
does not necessarily create a fair tax regime. "[V]ertical equity is key for
tax policymaking . ...

However, the fact that wealthy investors face a different tax burden
than middle-class investors does not itself necessitate a change in the tax
law. Any change would necessarily create losers who had structured their
investments based on prior law.1 2 Moreover, any change aimed at closing
the gap between the tax treatment of mutual fund investors and wealthy
investors would increase the complexity of the tax law. Complexity
increases both the cost of complying with and the cost of enforcing the tax

105.
See supra Part III.
106.
Susan Pace Hamill, An Argument for Tax Reform Based on Judeo-ChristianEthics, 54 ALA.
L. REv. 1, 46-47 (2002).
107.
See, e.g., Michael J. Graetz, Taxing InternationalIncome. InadequatePrinciples, Outdated
Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies, 26 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1357, 1402 (2001) (horizontal equity
requires "similar treatment of taxpayers similarly situated").
108.
Donna M. Byrne, ProgressiveTaxation Revisited, 37 ARIZ. L. REv. 739, 759 (1995).
109.
See, e.g., Danshera Cords, Charitable Contributionsfor DisasterRelief Rationalizing Tax
Consequences and Victim Benefits, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 427, 455 (2008) (stating that the larger
charitable deduction for high-income taxpayers violates vertical equity); Andrew D. Pike, No Wealthy
ParentLeft Behind: An Analysis of Tax Subsidiesfor Higher Education, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 1229, 125051 (2007) (stating that education tax credits disproportionately benefit high-income parents and violates
vertical equity).
110.
See infra notes 124-138 for a discussion of investing in mutual funds through taxadvantaged retirement accounts.
111.
Nancy C. Staudt, The Hidden Costs of the ProgressivityDebate, 50 VAND. L. REv. 919, 957
(1997).
112.
Michael Doran, Legislative Compromise and Tax Transition Policy, 74 U. CHI. L. REv. 545,
545 (2007) ("The question presents itself with particular force because of the stubborn fact that legal
transitions produce winners and losers.").
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law. 113 In addition, any change that tried to reduce the imposition of taxes
on mutual fund investors' forced realization income would presumably
decrease governmental revenue. Of course, increased complexity and
reduced revenue do not preclude making changes to the tax system,1 4 but
to justify these additional costs, any change to the current system must
provide benefits that offset the costs.
The taxation of mutual fund investors, when compared to the tax
treatment of direct portfolio investors or private investment fund investors,
does not meet the standard of vertical equity. In theory, of course,
progressive rates apply to all investors whether they invest through mutual
funds, through diversified portfolios, or through private investment funds.
However, a flat tax rate of 15% applies to long-term capital gains and
certain dividends received by most individuals.'15 True, under current law,
individuals in the two lowest tax brackets do not pay taxes on their longterm capital gains, which introduces some level of progressivity into the
world of investment income while wealthy taxpayers face a 20% rate on at
least a portion of their gains.' 16 But middle-class and wealthy taxpayers
will pay taxes at the same rate on their long-term capital gains and qualified
dividends.11 7 In general, because of the preferential rate on investment
income, the taxation of investments violates vertical equity norms.
In addition to the tax law's failure to apply vertical equity norms to
investors generally, the taxation of mutual fund investors fails to meet the
standard of vertical equity. Annually, mutual fund investors pay taxes on
both the actual income distributed to them or reinvested in the fund and on
the forced realization income that their mutual funds produce.' 18 Investors
with direct portfolios do not face the specter of forced realization income
and, because they decide when to sell securities, can control when (and
even if) they will recognize capital gains. 1 19 Private investment fund
investors, on the other hand, cannot control the timing of the fund's sales of
securities. However, private investment funds can allocate the forced
realization income to departing partners, meaning that private investment
fund investors do not pay taxes on forced realization income.120 Because

113.

JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: A CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO THE DEBATE

OVER TAXES 160 (4th ed. 2008).
114.
See, e.g., id. at 165 ("[B]efore we dismiss the U.S. system as unnecessarily complex and
therefore too costly, we must consider what, if anything, this complexity is buying us.").
I.R.C. § 1(h)(1)(C), (h)(1 1) (2006).
115.
116.
Id. § 1(h)(1)(B) (no taxation on capital gain in lowest two tax brackets); id. § 1(h)(1)(D)
(20% rate on capital gains for taxpayers in top marginal tax bracket).
Because of the flat rate on investment income, progressive tax rates will only apply to
117.
investors' short-term capital gains, interest income, and potentially to certain dividends.
118.
See supra notes 71-79 and accompanying text.
119.
I.R.C. § 1001.
120.
See supra notes 79-89 and accompanying text.
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mutual fund investors pay taxes on forced realization income while wealthy
investors can avoid such income altogether, the tax regime governing
mutual funds and their investors violates vertical equity norms and should
be rectified.
In addition to making the taxation of mutual fund investors fairer,
rectifying the tax burden on mutual fund investors could reduce
disincentives from saving and investing faced by individuals. The
imposition of an income tax functions as a "double tax on value that is not
immediately consumed."1 2 1 As such, it "encourages current consumption,
and thereby discourages the saving of income," even if, absent taxes,
people would prefer to save or invest.12 2 Arguably, some portion of
Americans' low savings rate should be attributed to the imposition of an
income tax.123 Although eliminating this distortion of taxpayers' savings
and consumption preferences would require a fundamental reform,
decreasing the tax hit mutual fund investors face could help to encourage
savings and investment.
To encourage middle-class investment and make the tax system more
fair, then, the tax law needs to address the issue of forced realization
income. And, to some extent, it already has. In 2011, 69% of U.S.
households reported having an individual retirement account (IRA), an
employer-sponsored retirement plan (such as a 401(k) plan), or both.12 4 In
2012, about 46% of IRA assets were invested in mutual funds.125 Similarly,
in 2012, mutual funds represented about 60% of 401(k) plan assets.12 6
Moreover, about half of the mutual funds held by U.S. households are held
through these tax-advantaged retirement accounts.127
As long as an investor holds her mutual fund shares through an IRA or
a 401(k) retirement plan, she is protected from paying taxes on forced
realization income that mutual funds necessarily generate. The tax law still
requires mutual funds held through IRAs and 401(k) accounts to pay
dividends of substantially all of their income to investors.12 8 These required
dividends still include gains on securities the mutual funds had to sell to
121.

Edward J. McCaffery, The Uneasy Case for Capital Taxation, in TAXATION, ECONOMIC

PROSPERITY, AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 166, 172 (Ellen Frankel Paul, et al. eds., 2006).

122.
John S. Nolan, The Merit of an Income Tax Versus a Consumption Tax, 12 AM. J. TAX
POL'Y 207, 212 (1995) (emphasis omitted).
123.
Id.
124.
ICI FACT BOOK, supra note 5, at 108.
125.
Frequently Asked Questions About Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs), ICI:
INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE [hereinafter ICI, IRAs], http://www.ici.org/policy/retirement/plan/
ira/faqsiras (last visited Aug. 8, 2013).
126.
Frequently Asked Questions About 401(k) Plans, ICI: INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE
[hereinafter ICI, 401(k)], http://www.ici.org/policy/retirement/plan/401k/faqs_401k (last visited Aug. 8,
2013).
127.
Coates, supra note 12, at 608.
128.
Id. at 596.
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meet its dividend and redemption requirements. But IRAs and 401(k) plans
are tax-deferred retirement plans; investors do not pay taxes on their
income or gains from the plans until they withdraw their money. 129 Instead,
they reinvest their dividends in the fund, which maintains the net asset
value of their fund.
Still, even with access to IRAs and 401(k) plans, middle-class
investors remain on unequal footing with wealthy investors. Holding
investments through these tax-deferred retirement accounts still does not
provide an investment vehicle equivalent to those available to the wealthy
for a number of reasons, both tax-related and not. Although IRAs and
401(k) plans permit a taxpayer to defer the taxation of her investment
income, when she withdraws income from the plan, she pays taxes at
ordinary, not capital, rates.13 0 The imposition of tax at ordinary rates,
irrespective of the underlying character of the mutual fund's gains, can
make investments in mutual funds through retirement accounts
"unattractive relative even to taxable investments in mutual funds."13 1
Retirement account investors could avoid this taxation if they never
withdrew money from their retirement accounts. In fact, direct investors in
portfolio securities can entirely avoid paying income taxes on their gains by
holding their securities until death. 13 2 In general, though, the owners of taxadvantaged retirement accounts cannot defer their gains until death.
Instead, the tax rules governing IRAs and 401(k)s require investors to take
mandatory distributions. 33 This concomitantly requires them to pay taxes
at ordinary rates on those distributions.
In addition to the disadvantageous tax aspects associated with
retirement fund distributions, investors face limitations on whether and
how much they can contribute to a retirement fund in the first place. 401(k)
plans must be established by an employer.134 If a taxpayer's employer does
not offer a 401(k) plan, an IRA is her only option for tax-deferred
investment. In 2012, an individual could contribute $5,000 to her IRA, and
$17,000 to her 401(k) retirement account.13 5 To the extent her savings in
any given year exceed the amount she can put into her IRA and her 401(k),
she must pay taxes on forced realization income, taxes that can be avoided
by wealthier investors.

129.
Id. at 608.
130.
See Kertz & Simko, supra note 58, at 103 n.2. Roth IRAs represent an exception to this rule,
with no tax imposed on withdrawals. Id.
Coates, supra note 12, at 608.
131.
132.
I.R.C. § 1014 (2006).
Id. §§ 401(a)(9), 408(a)(6).
133.
134.
Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-l(b)(1)(i) (amended 2007).
I.R.S. Notice 2011-90, 2011-47 C.B. 791.
135.
Id.
136.
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Moreover, even where a taxpayer's investments will not exceed the
amount that she could contribute to tax-advantaged retirement funds, the
retirement funds may not provide her with the flexibility that she needs. In
general, if the taxpayer takes a distribution from her 401(k) plan or her IRA
before she turns 592, she will not only have to pay taxes on the amount
distributed, but she will have to pay an additional 10% tax on the
distributed amount.137
Moreover, to the extent that tax-advantaged retirement plans provide
net advantages to investors, those advantages do not accrue solely to the
middle class. The wealthy also have access to these plans. As such, the
availability of these tax-deferred savings vehicles does not bring middleclass investors' options closer to those available to the wealthy.
IRAs and 401(k) accounts also fail to close the gap between investment
options available to the wealthy and to the middle-class for at least one
significant non-tax reason. The government rightly encourages individuals
to save for retirement, but investors often have other savings goals, too.
While nearly all mutual fund investors are saving for retirement, nearly half
are also saving for emergencies, and 24% of mutual fund investors are
saving for an education.' 38 The wealthy can save for emergencies,
education, and other non-retirement objectives without facing taxation on
forced realization income; middle-class mutual fund investors generally
cannot counteract the tax on forced realization income for non-retirement
savings goals.
IV. RESTORING INVESTMENT EQUITY FOR MIDDLE-CLASS INVESTORS
Paying taxes on forced realization income treats mutual fund
investors-many of whom are low- or middle-class-worse than the tax
law treats investors who can afford other types of investments. Any
solution to the problem needs to take into account these investors' relative
lack of access to sophisticated financial and tax advice. A solution that
imposed cumbersome compliance requirements could be worse than the
problem it attempts to fix. As a result, this Article's proposed solution to
the problem of forced realization income is simple. Mutual fund
shareholders should be permitted to exclude 10% of their capital gain
dividends from their gross income annually.
Though the solution is simple, explaining the policy choices underlying
the solution, as well as some secondary implications of the exclusion,
including the allocation of basis and the determination of which shares a
137.
I.R.C. § 72(t)(1). The 10% penalty on early withdrawals is subject to certain hardship
exceptions. Id. § 72(t)(2).
ICI FACT BOOK, supra note 5, at 87.
138.
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shareholder redeems, is more complex. In this Part, the Article will detail
the technical problems and solutions associated with the 10% exclusion.
Upon implementation, though, these complexities will remain invisible
to mutual fund investors. Mutual funds must provide redeeming
shareholders with information, including their sale price, adjusted basis,
and holding period in the shares they redeemed.'3 9 Whether or not
Congress implemented this 10% exclusion, mutual funds would need to
calculate shareholders' bases and provide that information to them. As a
result, notwithstanding the intricacies of arriving at the best solution to the
problem of forced realization income, once in place, shareholders will
generally not face any additional administrative difficulties.14 0
A. A ProportionateResponse
To make mutual fund taxation more equitable, Congress should permit
mutual fund shareholders to exclude from their gross income 10% of the
capital gain dividends they receive each year from mutual funds, provided
they reinvest those dividends in the fund. Moreover, to promote vertical
equity and to prevent the government from losing too much revenue, the
exclusion should phase out as a shareholder's income increases.
This exemption will not perfectly solve the problem of forced
realization income, of course. How much forced realization income a
mutual fund produces depends on the number and value of redemptions in
any given year, the securities it chooses to sell, and the amount of built-in
gain or loss in those securities, as well as its cash on hand. If mutual funds
had to calculate annually the amount of forced realization income they
distributed to shareholders, the solution would be administratively
infeasible. An administrable solution would be to choose a proxy for the
amount of forced realization income a mutual fund shareholder could
expect to receive.
No study could quantify exactly how much forced realization income
each mutual fund-holding household receives each year. The variables that
determine that amount-including the identity and value of the mutual
funds held by the household and the quantity of redemptions made by the
mutual fund-will differ from household to household. Still, we have some
data that we can use to determine a fair exclusion amount.

139.
I.R.C. §6045(b) (requiring brokers to provide certain information to redeeming
shareholders); Treas. Reg. § 1.6045-1(b) Ex. 1(i) (amended 2010) (including mutual funds in definition
of "broker"); id. § I(d)(2)(i) (detailing information a broker must provide shareholders).
140.
The one exception would be shareholders for whom the 10% exclusion had phased out. The
phaseout will only apply to shareholders at higher income levels, however, who have better access to
financial and tax advice.
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In 2011, roughly 52.3 million U.S. households owned mutual funds.14 1
The number of mutual fund-owning households has stayed relatively steady
over the last decade.14 2 Those 52.3 million households held more than 80%
of mutual fund assets; taxable household accounts alone held 34% of
mutual fund assets. 143
Capital Gain Distributionsto Taxable
HouseholdAccounts
(in billions of dollars)
$61
$82
$115
$16
$6
$6
$21
$45
$80
$135
$30
$4
$18
$30
$46.4

1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
Average

Table 1'44
The gross amount of capital gain dividends distributed to shareholders
has varied wildly from year to year. In 2011, however, mutual funds
distributed $30 billion of capital gain dividends to taxable household
accounts.14 5 The total capital gain dividends from 2011 were slightly lower
than the average annual capital gain dividend from 1998 to 2011 of $46.4
billion.14 6 Currently there is no data on what portion of mutual funds'
141.
ICI FACT BOOK, supranote 5, at 86.
142.
Id.
143.
Id. at 204. Tax-deferred household accounts and tax-exempt funds accounted for another
56% of mutual funds, while I1% were held by taxable non-household accounts. Id.
144.
Id. at 207.
145.
Id. By way of comparison, in 2009, funds only paid capital gain dividends of $4 billion,
while in 2007, they paid capital gain dividends of $135 billion. Id.
146.
Id. See also supra Table 1.
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capital gain dividends represent forced realization income; moreover, the
amount of forced realization income would differ from fund to fund and
from year to year. As such, it is currently impossible to determine the
precise level of exemption that would perfectly ameliorate the harms of
forced realization income.147 As a result, an approximation, such as 10% of
a mutual fund shareholder's capital gain dividends, is the best we can
currently do.
Any exclusion amount would represent a loss of revenue to the
government. But a 10% exclusion would not cost the government much
comparatively. It would have reduced government revenue in 2011 by not
more than $450 million.148 By way of comparison, the mortgage interest
deduction reduced government revenues by an estimated $93.8 billion in
2011,149 while the deduction for charitable contributions cost the
government about $34.5 billion.so The cost of this 10% exclusion would
fall more in line with the deduction of interest on student loans, which cost
the government an estimated $500 million in 2011.51
In practice, moreover, the exclusion would cost the government less
than the estimated $450 million. Tax-exempt retirement funds hold
approximately 40% of mutual fund assets. Because taxpayers who hold
mutual funds through these funds do not owe taxes on capital gain
dividends under current law, exempting 10% of capital gain dividends from
tax will not further reduce government revenue. 152 In addition, under
current law, households in the bottom two tax brackets pay no taxes on
their capital gains.153 As a result, the exemption will not decrease the taxes
they pay. Moreover, the exemption will phase out for higher income
147.
If the government wanted more precision in its exemption amount, it could determine the
average amount of capital gain dividends from mutual funds that represented forced realization income
and set the exemption at that amount, or it could require each mutual fund to determine annually what
portion of its capital gain dividends represented forced realization income and to include that amount on
its annual statement to shareholders. Both of these solutions, though, seem more administratively
intense than necessary; a broad 10% exclusion is easy to figure out, easy for mutual funds and
shareholders to comply with, and easy for the I.R.S. to administer.
$30 billion x 10% (exempt amount) x 15% (tax rate on long-term capital gains) = $450
148.
million. This number does not take into account changes in behavior that the exclusion would cause.
Dynamic scoring, however, requires making assumptions that are beyond the scope of this Article. See,
e.g., Heather Bennett, Crippen on Dynamic Scoring: Fish or Cut Bait, 95 TAX NOTES 1714, 1714
(2002) ("[Tihe CBO can't implement dynamic scoring and retain any sort of credibility, Crippen
charged, because dynamic scoring requires that his office factor in assumptions about future economic
growth and future fiscal policy.").
149.
STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 111TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX
EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2010-2014 39 (Comm. Print 2010).
150.
Id. at 47.
151.
Id. at 44.
152.
In 2012, IRAs held about 19% of mutual fund assets, ICI, IRAs, supra note 125, while
401(k) plans held an additional 17% of mutual fund assets as of September, 30 2012. ICI, 401(k), supra
note 126.
1.R.C. § 1(h)(1)(B) (2006).
153.
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shareholders.' 54 As a result, the full exemption will not be available to all
households that would otherwise qualify, and these high-income mutual
fund shareholders will pay taxes on more than 90% of their capital gain
dividends. An exclusion of 10% of a taxpayer's capital gain dividends
would thus largely ameliorate the problems created by forced realization
income without undue cost to the government.
1. HistoricalPrecedents

Permitting taxpayers to exclude from their income a portion of the
dividends they receive is not a novel approach. For thirty-two years,
corporate shareholders could exclude a set amount of dividends from their
gross income. Under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, individuals could
exclude up to $50 of dividends received from domestic corporations from
their gross income.155 Congress intended for this exclusion to "afford[]
complete relief from the double tax on small amounts of dividend
income."156 Though Congress did not index the exemption to inflation, in
1980, the amount of dividends excludable from gross income temporarily
increased to $200, or $400 for married taxpayers filing jointly."' In 1982,
it returned to its pre-1980 levels, and it was ultimately repealed by the Tax
Reform Act of 1986.15
Still, the former dividend exclusion differs from the one proposed here
in significant ways. The amounts shareholders exclude differs, of course.
Moreover, the former dividend exclusion applied to substantially all
dividends from domestic corporations, 5 9 while this proposal would apply
solely to capital gain dividends paid by mutual funds. The former exclusion
applied irrespective of a shareholder's income, while this proposal would
phase out above an income threshold.
These differences arise because the purpose underlying the exclusion
of capital gain dividends proposed here differs from Congress's purpose in
permitting taxpayers to exclude a set amount of dividends from income.
Where Congress used the broad dividend exclusion to provide partial
integration between the corporate and individual income tax regimes, this
proposed exclusion would function instead to ameliorate the taxes on
forced realization income faced by mutual fund shareholders that do not
154.

See infra Part IV.D.

155.

I.R.C.

§ 116(a),

68A Stat. 3, 37 (1954).

S. REP. NO. 83-1622, at 6 (1954).
STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 96TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE
157.
CRUDE OIL WINDFALL PROFIT TAX ACT OF 1980, at 122 (Comm. Print 1980).
158.
JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31597, THE TAXATION OF DIVIDEND
INCOME: AN OVERVIEW AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUES 3 (2008).
156.

159.

I.R.C.

§ 116(a), 68A

Stat. 3, 37 (1954).
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apply to other investments. Though the two dividend exclusions differ in
motivation and in implementation, the former exclusion of dividends
demonstrates that the tax law is capable of implementing and administering
an exclusion regime.
2. Excluding Capital Gain Dividends

More recently, an exclusion of capital gain dividends has been
proposed in Congress to make mutual fund taxation more equitable. In the
110th Congress, Representative Jim Saxton sponsored a bill that would
allow mutual fund shareholders to defer taxation on up to $5,000 (or
$10,000 in the case of a joint return) of capital gain dividends annually. 60
This deferral would be available to shareholders who automatically
reinvested their dividends and would be indexed for inflation.161
Rep. Saxton proposed his $5,000 deferral to make mutual fund taxation
more equitable, especially for low- and middle-income Americans. The
proposed bill, however, is problematic: by permitting shareholders to defer
paying taxes on up to $10,000 of reinvested capital gain dividends, it would
effectively eliminate the taxation of mutual fund capital gains until
shareholders redeemed their shares or stopped reinvesting their dividends.
With such a high exclusion, approximately 85% of mutual fund
shareholders would be able to defer the entire amount of capital gain
dividends they received from their mutual funds annually.' 62 Such a full
exclusion would put mutual fund shareholders in a significantly better
position than investors in pass-through entities.
Why such a generous exclusion in the proposed bill? According to the
report of the Joint Economic Committee (chaired by Rep. Saxton), there
appear to have been two reasons. First, the Joint Economic Committee
worried about shareholders' lack of liquidity. Paying taxes on reinvested
capital gain dividends could force shareholders to sell shares, even when
they did not want to, to pay their tax bill.'6 3 Second, the Committee argued
that taxing capital gain dividends violated the horizontal equity between
mutual fund shareholders and similarly situated investors who owned stock
directly.16

160.
H.R. 397, 110th Cong. § I (1st Sess. 2007).
161.
Id.
162.
Coates, supra note 12, at 616; see also JOINT ECON. COMM., 107TH CONG., THE TAXATION
OF MUTUAL FUND INVESTORS: PERFORMANCE, SAVING AND INVESTMENT 18-19 (2001).
163.
JOINT ECON. COMM., supra note 162, at 4 ("Unfortunately, the current tax law treatment of
capital gain realizations also can force shareholders of mutual funds to pay capital gain taxes on their
mutual fund holdings even when shareholders choose not to sell shares.").
164.
Id. at 5 ("This treatment violates the economic principle of horizontal equity.").
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Neither of these concerns compels such a high exclusion amount,
however. Mutual fund shareholders can receive their dividends in cash,
rather than reinvesting the dividends; in fact, mutual funds cannot require
shareholders to reinvest their dividends.165 If a shareholder believed she
could not otherwise afford her tax bill, she could elect to receive all or a
portion of her dividend in cash.
Moreover, according to the report, mutual fund shareholders and direct
shareholders are not similarly situated. Although the mutual fund taxation
rules attempt to create rough parity between mutual fund shareholders and
direct investors, significant differences exist between mutual fund and
direct investors. For example, low- and middle-income households invest
in mutual funds precisely because "they usually cannot afford the relatively
large amounts of capital necessary to build their own diversified portfolio
of stocks."'6 6 If a mutual fund shareholder cannot afford the diversified
portfolio that a direct investor holds, the two investors are not similarly
situated, and addressing horizontal equity between direct and mutual fund
investors does not help to determine the proper tax treatment of mutual
fund shareholders.
Such a high exclusion amount would effectively transform mutual
funds from quasi-pass-through entities into tax shelters. Under Rep.
Saxton's proposal, like under this proposal, the ability of mutual fund
shareholders to exclude a portion of their dividends would not affect the
fund's ability to take a deduction for dividends paid. As such, the mutual
fund would not pay taxes on the gains it distributed to shareholders. But
shareholders who reinvested their dividends in the paying fund would not
pay taxes on their share of the fund's capital gains in the year earned either.
The capital gain dividends would, instead, increase the value of the
shareholders' investment in the fund. Eventually, if a shareholder redeemed
her shares, she would pay taxes on the dividends in the form of additional
gain on her shares. But if, instead, she held the shares until death, she could
bequeath them to her heirs, untaxed, and her heirs could step up their basis
in the shares.16 7 Effectively, up to $10,000 of gains per year could remain
permanently untaxed. 16 8

165.
In order for a mutual fund-or any other corporation-to treat a distribution of its own stock
as a dividend, shareholders must have the right to elect to receive the distribution either in the form of
cash (or other property) or the payor's stock. I.R.C. § 305(b)(1) (2006).
JOINT ECON. COMM., supra note 162, at 5.
166.
167.
I.R.C. § 1014(a).
168.
See Samuel D. Brunson, Taxing Investors on a Mark-to-Market Basis, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
507, 514 n.19 (2010) ("In fact, under I.R.C. § 1014(a)(1), if she holds an appreciated security until her
death, her heirs will inherit the appreciated security with a tax basis equal to its fair market value as of
the date of her death. Any appreciation in the value of the security as of that date remains permanently
untaxed.").

2013]

Mutual Funds, Fairness, and the Income Gap

167

This exemption would almost certainly ameliorate the vertical equity
problem, of course. It seems virtually impossible that a middle-class mutual
fund investor would receive dividends that included more than $10,000 of
forced realization income in a year. But the ability to shelter a significant
amount of income would materially impact the federal government's
revenue. Moreover, it would have significant distortionary effects. Wealthy
investors would have incentive to shift some significant portion of their
investment strategy from private investment funds to mutual funds because
mutual funds would allow them to shelter $10,000 of income per year.169
And mutual funds would face pressure to shift their investment strategies in
a way that maximized their net long-term capital gains at the expense of
other types of income.17 0 To maximize its long-term capital gains, a mutual
fund would need to hold its securities for longer than one year,' 7 ' but
investors would demand that it sell its appreciated securities as soon as it
had held them long enough, irrespective of what the fund would have done
absent tax-induced distortions.
While vertical equity concerns argue in favor of ameliorating the
effects of forced realization income on middle-class and poor mutual fund
shareholders, they do not support an exclusion so large that it risks
transforming mutual funds into tax shelters. They do not support creating
significant distortions in the investment decision-making of mutual funds.
And they do not support creating significant distortions in the investment
decisions of investors. A more modest exclusion, such as the one proposed
here, would ameliorate the inequitable effects of forced realization income
on the tax bills of middle-class investors while, at the same time, not
providing such a significant tax benefit that it will change the investment
decisions of wealthy investors or mutual funds themselves.
3.

CapitalGain Dividends

This proposal would permit mutual fund shareholders to exclude a
portion of their capital gain dividends only. But mutual funds' income does
not consist solely of long-term capital gains. A mutual fund can also
receive dividends on the corporate stock they hold and interest on bonds.
To maintain its beneficial tax status, it must distribute to shareholders not

169.
Specifically, it would make sense for wealthy investors to shift enough of their investments
from private funds to mutual funds so that they would receive $ 10,000 of capital gain dividends a year.
170.
A mutual fund's capital gain dividend is the amount it designates as such, but cannot exceed
its "net capital gain." I.R.C. § 852(b)(3)(C); Treas. Reg. § 1.852-4(c)(1) (amended 1984). A mutual
fund's net capital gain is its long-term capital gain reduced by its short-term capital loss. .R.C.
§ 1222(11).
I.R.C. § 1222(3).
171.
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only substantially all of its net capital gain, but also substantially all of its
dividend and interest income too. 172
No part of a mutual fund's forced realization income consists of
dividend or interest income, however. The amount of dividends and interest
a mutual fund receives not only falls outside the fund's control, but it also
has no connection with shareholders' redemptions. Dividends and interest
represent real accessions to wealth for the mutual fund. Upon receiving a
dividend distribution or interest payment, the mutual fund's net asset value
increases and, with it, the value of shareholders' shares. Moreover, a
shareholder's paying taxes currently on her pro rata share of the fund's
income does not violate vertical equity considerations. An investor with
direct portfolio holdings also pays taxes upon receipt of interest and
dividends. Although she can determine when to realize appreciation by
selling her securities, she does not control when or if she will receive
dividends,173 and market demands determine the amount of interest paid on
corporate bonds. 174 Likewise, private investment funds cannot "stuff'
interest and dividend income to departing investors. All investors pay taxes
on their interest and dividends, and mutual fund investors should not be
different in this regard.
Moreover, determining what portion of their mutual fund dividends
represent capital gain dividends should not create any administrative
burden for mutual fund shareholders. Every year, mutual funds must
provide an I.R.S. Form 1099-DIV to their shareholders.' 7 5 In Box 2a of the
Form 1099-DIV, a mutual fund designates the amount of capital gain
dividend received by the shareholder.' 76 As such, mutual fund shareholders
already have the information they need to determine the amount of capital
gain dividends they receive each year. Limiting the exclusion to capital
gain dividends should not present them with any material administrative
difficulty.

Id. § 851(b)(2)(A).
172.
Dividends are paid at a corporate board's discretion; shareholders cannot require that the
173.
board declare and pay dividends. See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, The Shareholder as Ulysses: Some Empirical
Evidence on Why Investors in Public Corporations Tolerate Board Governance, 152 U. PA. L. REV.
667, 676 (2003) ("Shareholders cannot pay themselves dividends; if a dividend is declared at all, it must
be declared by the board. If the board refuses to declare a dividend, in the typical public firm there is
little the shareholders can do about it.").
See, e.g., Michael S. Knoll, Compaq Redux: Implicit Taxes and the Question of Pre-Tax
174.
Profit, 26 VA. TAX REV. 821, 833 (2007) ("Thus, we can expect competition among investors and
issuers to drive down the interest rate on municipal bonds and drive up the interest rate on corporate
bonds.").
175.
Treas. Reg. § 1.6042-3(a)(3) (amended 2000); Treas. Reg. § 301.6722-1(d)(2)(v) (as
amended in 2013); I.R.C. §6042(c).
I.R.S. Form 1099-DIV; see also I.R.C. § 852(b)(3)(C) (permitting mutual funds to designate
176.
the amount of their capital gain dividend in a written statement to shareholders).
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4. Reinvestment
This proposed exclusion would not affect the taxation of mutual funds
themselves. Under this dividend-exclusion regime, the tax law would
continue to treat mutual funds as quasi-pass-through entities, and mutual
funds would still need to distribute substantially all of their income,
including phantom gains generated when redeeming departing
shareholders. Mutual funds would continue to deduct from their taxable
incomes their dividends paid, and shareholders would continue to look
through the dividends to characterize their income. The only change to the
subpart M regime would be to the taxation of mutual fund shareholders:
such shareholders would not include in income, and therefore not pay taxes
on, all of their mutual fund dividends.
Still, the forced realization income problems do not require an
unbounded exclusion; as such, the proposal limits the amount of the
exclusion 7 and the particular type of dividend to be excluded. 7 In
addition to those exclusions, a shareholder would be permitted to exclude
her capital gain dividends only if she reinvested those dividends in the fund
through a dividend reinvestment plan. Although distributions of forced
realization income do not necessarily represent economic gain to mutual
fund shareholders,' 7 9 neither do ordinary corporate dividends. Instead,
receiving a dividend unlocks the appreciation that the corporation-mutual
fund or not-has amassed. Rather than taxing this appreciation as it occurs,
though, shareholders of ordinary corporations defer their tax liability until
they receive some sort of "tangible benefit."' 80
When a mutual fund shareholder receives a dividend and does not
reinvest it in the fund, she has complete control over the money. She can
use it to purchase whatever property she likes. By keeping the dividend,
she has received a tangible benefit of a type that generally triggers taxation.
On the other hand, where a shareholder reinvests her dividend subject to a
dividend reinvestment plan, she neither receives a tangible benefit from the
dividend nor improves her economic situation. Under a dividend
reinvestment plan, shareholders can elect whether to take their dividends in
cash or in additional stock of the mutual fund paying the dividend."8 ' The

177.
See supranotes 160-171 and accompanying text.
178.
See supra notes 172-176 and accompanying text.
179.
See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
180.
Jeffrey L. Kwall, When Should Asset Appreciation Be Taxed?: The Case for a Disposition
Standard of Realization, 86 IND. L.J. 77, 80 (2011) ("By conditioning realization on the
contemporaneous receipt of a tangible benefit, the courts treated asset appreciation in the same manner
as other forms of income . . ., which normally occur when a person receives money or property.").
181.

DEP'T OF TREASURY, INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE TAX SYSTEMS:

TAXING BUSINESS INCOME ONCE 87 (1992) ("We contemplate that this would be permitted through an
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mutual fund shareholder who elects to participate in the dividend
reinvestment plan includes the value of the additional stock in income as if
it were cash, while the mutual fund can take a dividends paid deduction for
the same amount, even though the additional shares do not represent an
expense to the mutual fund. 182 Dividend reinvestment plans create no nontax economic consequences for mutual fund shareholders. The only
difference from the shareholder's point of view is that she will own more
shares of the fund, albeit with the same value as her shares had before.
Because dividends received in the form of shares have no economic
consequence to shareholders and do not unlock any value, limiting the
exclusion to dividends reinvested in the paying mutual fund subject to a
dividend reinvestment plan is not unfair to investors who receive their
dividend payments in cash. The receipt of cash provides a separate basis for
taxation and differs materially from the reinvested dividends.
Relatedly, the rules should be written in such a way that a mutual fund
shareholder cannot reinvest only her capital gain dividends while taking the
rest of her mutual fund dividends in cash. Rather, to the extent that her
dividend reinvestment plan applies only to a portion of her dividend, the
proportion of the reinvested dividend treated as a capital gain dividend to
the full amount reinvested should be the same as the proportion of entire
capital gain dividend to the full mutual fund dividend.
That is, assume that Mutual Fund X pays a $100 dividend, $20 of
which it designates as a capital gain dividend. Jane, a shareholder, reinvests
$20 subject to the fund's dividend reinvestment plan and takes the other
$80 in cash. Under these proposed rules, she could not claim that the
reinvested $20 was entirely a capital gain dividend and exclude $2 from
income. Instead, because the capital gain dividend represents 20% of the
full dividend, only 20% of the reinvested amount (or $4) can be treated as a
capital gain dividend. As a result, Jane could not exclude more than $0.40
from income. 183
B. Other Reform Options
Congress has other options that could also address the inequities faced
by mutual fund shareholders. It could, for example, replace the current
income tax with a consumption tax, which would entirely eliminate the
taxation of capital gains. 184 If gains did not constitute taxable income,
elective dividend reinvestment plan (DRIP). DRIPs may be adopted by corporations under current law;
such plans commonly are used by mutual funds and utilities.").
182.
Treas. Reg. § 1.305-2(b) Ex. 2 (amended 1973).
183.
$2:$100::$0.40:$20.
Coates, supra note 12, at 614 ("The simplest, most general improvement for taxation of
184.
mutual funds would be to eliminate taxes on capital gains altogether.").
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mutual fund investors would be indifferent, for tax purposes at least, to the
fund's selling securities to redeem shareholders.185 Although a
consumption tax would eliminate the problem of forced realization income,
switching from an income to a consumption tax represents fundamental tax
reform. Whether to institute such a significant reform implicates far more
than just the taxation of mutual funds and is outside the scope of this
Article.
As a more targeted alternative solution, Congress could include mutual
funds among true pass-through entities. As true pass-through entities,
mutual funds could "stuff' gains to departing shareholders. 18 6 Moving
mutual funds from their current quasi-pass-through status to a true passthrough status would not represent a fundamental change of the tax law;
rather, it addresses the problem of mutual fund forced realization income
by altering the taxation of mutual funds specifically. However, it would
represent a fundamental change in the tax treatment of mutual funds.
The additional complexity and costs mutual funds and their
shareholders would incur as a result of such a fundamental change would
likely counterbalance the benefits of eliminating forced realization
income.187 Pass-through tax treatment originally aimed to provide taxpayers
with flexibility.188 With that flexibility, however, came abuses as taxpayers
began shifting income and other tax attributes in ways Congress had not
anticipated.189 In response, the tax rules governing pass-through entities
have become more and more complex, technical, and costly to comply
with.190 For wealthy investors, the advantages of true pass-through status
are significant enough that it makes economic sense for them to deal with
the complexity and cost of a true pass-through regime; for the average

185.
While there are arguments in favor of shifting from an income tax to a consumption tax,
mutual fund investors' forced realization income seems insufficient to justify such a seismic shift. See,
e.g., Michael J. Graetz, Implementing a Progressive Consumption Tax, 92 HARv. L. REv. 1575, 1661
(1979) ("[T]he practical problems of implementing a graduated tax on consumption are indeed greatfar greater than has been previously suggested by its recent proponents. Given these practical
difficulties, proponents of such a tax should be required to demonstrate that its claimed advantages in
terms of equity and economic efficiency are real and cannot be achieved in a simpler fashion . . . ."). As
such, while fundamentally altering the federal tax regime would solve the inequities faced by mutual
fund investors, arguing in favor of a consumption tax is beyond the scope of this Article.
186.
See supranotes 79-89 and accompanying text.
Coates, supra note 12, at 614.
187.
Lawrence Lokken, Taxation of Private Business Firms: Imagining a Future Without
188.
Subchapter K, 4 FLA. TAx REv. 249, 250 (1999) ("The original conception of subchapter K [was]
flexibility with some limitations. . .
Id.
189.
Andrea Monroe, What's in a Name: Can the Partnership Anti-Abuse Rule Really Stop
190.
Partnership Tax Abuse?, 60 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 401, 402-03 (2010) ("Taken together, these
problems have triggered another of subchapter K's afflictions-complexity."); see also AM. LAW INST.,
FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT SUBCHAPTER K 7 (1984) ("The pure pass-through model can only be
achieved in practice at an intolerable cost in complexity.").
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mutual fund investor, however, "it is not clear that the benefits of reduced
capital gains taxes would be worth the annual additional tax compliance
and record-keeping costs that partnership tax would create."' 91
Alternatively, Congress could reduce or eliminate mutual funds'
distribution requirement. While this would significantly change the current
tax qualification of mutual funds, it would not constitute a fundamental
change in their nature. If mutual funds did not have to distribute
substantially all of their income, they could avoid distributing taxable
forced realization income to their shareholders. Because mutual funds are
corporations, rather than true pass-through entities, mutual fund
shareholders do not pay taxes on income when the mutual fund earns it.
Rather, they pay taxes when the mutual fund distributes its income as
dividends.1 92
Mutual funds achieve their quasi-pass-through status by virtue of two
things: First, mutual funds can designate a portion of their dividends as
"capital gain dividend[s]." 93 Shareholders pay taxes at long-term capital
gain rates on the capital gain dividend portion of the fund's dividend,1 94
which essentially permits shareholders to look through the mutual fund to
determine the character of their income. Second, qualified mutual funds
can deduct the dividends they pay from their taxable income. 19s This
deduction for dividends paid eliminates the double taxation mutual fund
shareholders would otherwise face. 196 To qualify for the deduction, though,
a mutual fund must distribute substantially all of its income every year. 19 7
But for the distribution requirement, a mutual fund would not need to
distribute its forced realization income from selling securities to fund
redemptions. Eliminating the distribution requirement would allow mutual
funds to distribute only real economic income to shareholders.
This solution, too, has problems, though. As a taxable entity, a mutual
fund would pay taxes on any income that it did not distribute to
shareholders. This is worse than either a direct portfolio investment or an
investment in a private investment fund. Direct portfolio investments
cannot create forced realization income, while private investments funds do
not pay taxes and can allocate phantom gains in such a way that they do not
affect the remaining partners or the fund's net asset value.
Moreover, if mutual funds had no distribution requirement, wealthy
individuals could use them as tax shelters. Under current law, the top two
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Coates, supranote 12, at 614.
Treas. Reg. § 1.852-4(a), (b) (as amended in 1984).
I.R.C. § 852(b)(3)(C)(i) (2006).
Id. §852(b)(3)(B).
Id. §852(b)(2)(D).
See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
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individual marginal rates is 39.6%.198 At the same time, corporate tax rates
appear likely to fall.1 99 If corporate rates fall significantly below individual
rates, there may be tax advantages in leaving as much money as possibleundistributed-in closely-held corporations, including in mutual funds.20 0
And, in fact, if mutual funds continued to qualify for the deduction for
dividends received, mutual funds would be even more attractive than
ordinary corporations for sheltering income.
Although these other options could also improve the fairness of mutual
fund investment, the 10% exclusion is a better option. The problem of
forced realization income, though significant, clearly does not by itself
warrant fundamentally changing federal taxes from income to consumption
taxes. Moreover, fundamental alteration of the mutual fund regime could
have unintended consequences that make mutual funds less appealing to
middle-class taxpayers (or more appealing to wealthy taxpayers who want
to avoid taxation).
C. CalculatingBasis
Because taxable income includes gains from the sale of property, the
tax law needs to provide a way for taxpayers to figure out the amount of
their gain on which they should pay taxes. Basis plays an essential role in
this calculation. When a taxpayer acquires property, that property has a
basis. In general, the basis of property is the cost of that property to its
owner201 with certain adjustments made to take into account
"deductions . . . [that] effectively allow[] taxpayers to receive money tax
free." 202
An income tax should tax income only once to any one shareholder. 20 3
Basis functions as a placeholder for previously taxed income to avoid its
double taxation. 2 04 When a taxpayer sells property, she calculates the
amount of gain on which she pays taxes by subtracting her basis in the
198.
Rev. Proc. 2013-15 §2.01, 2013-5 I.R.B. 444.
Republican Representative Paul Ryan's 2012 proposed budget resolution would, among
199.
other things, reduce the top corporate tax rate to 25%. Michael Beller, Obama Calls House GOP Budget
"Laughable," 135 TAX NOTES 146, 146 (2012). At the same time, President Obama's corporate tax
reform framework proposed dropping the corporate rate to 28%. Meg Shreve et al., Obama Offers
Corporate Tax Plan Lowering Rate to 28 Percent, 134 TAX NOTES 1045, 1045 (2012).
200.
Martin A. Sullivan, Economic Analysis: Will Rate Changes Transform C Corps Into Tax
Shelters?, 134 TAX NOTES 1590, 1590 (2012).
201.
I.R.C. § 1012(a) (2006).
Adam Chodorow, Tracing Basis Through Virtual Spaces, 95 CORNELL L. REv. 283, 293
202.
(2010).
203.
See id. at 292 ("One of the key tenets of any income tax is the notion that income should be
taxed once, and only once, in the hands of the same taxpayer.").
See id. ("The rules regarding basis and basis recovery found throughout the Code and
204.
regulations are designed to allow taxpayers to track their previously taxed income .... .").
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property from the amount she receives in exchange for the property.205 The
basis, excluded from her gross income, represents the previously taxed
money that she used to acquire the asset.
Assume, for example, that Miles purchased one share of a mutual fund
for $10. He has presumably already paid taxes on that $10.206 A year later,
he sells his share for $15. Without some system of basis recovery, he could
potentially pay taxes on the full $15. The sale does not represent an
accession to $15 of wealth, however; his economic situation has improved
by only $5 over the course of the year. Moreover, he has only $5 on which
he did not previously pay taxes. But, since he has a basis of $10, in fact he
will pay taxes only on the $5 of gain because he will subtract his basis from
the amount realized.
Under this proposal, however, a taxpayer may receive some untaxed
mutual fund shares each year. In general, when mutual fund shareholders
participate in a dividend reinvestment plan, their basis in their mutual fund
shares should increase. Because mutual fund shareholders pay taxes on
these reinvested dividends, they need the placeholder of basis so that, when
they redeem their shares, they avoid paying taxes on the same income
twice.
The exemption raises three significant issues with respect to basis.
First, a taxpayer must determine how to allocate the excluded dividends
among the mutual funds she owns. Second, she must figure out how to
determine her basis in the excluded dividends. And third, when she
redeems her shares, she may need to determine which shares of her mutual
fund she is redeeming.
1. Allocating the Excluded Dividends
The issue of how to allocate excluded dividends does not matter to a
shareholder who owns shares of only one mutual fund. If the shareholder
owns shares of only one mutual fund, then all of her excluded dividends
will be from that mutual fund. If, however, she owns more than one mutual
fund, she will need to determine which dividends she received tax-free.
Congress could choose from at least three methods to determine which
capital gain dividends a shareholder should exclude from her income. The
205.
I.R.C. § 1001(a). This amount realized includes not only money, but also the fair market
value of property and of services she receives in exchange for the property. Id. § 1001(b) (amount
realized includes "any money received plus the fair market value of the property (other than money)
received"); Int'l Freighting Corp. v. Comm'r, 135 F.2d 310, 313 (2d Cir. 1943) ("Literally, where there
is a disposition of stock for services, no 'property' or 'money' is received by the person who
thus disposes of the stock.").
206.
This presumption is not true in every case; if Miles received the $10 as a gift or bequest, for
example, he was not required to include it in his gross income. I.R.C. § 102(a). But in general, the
money taxpayers have was taxed when received. See id. § 62.
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tax law could, for example, permit a shareholder to elect which of her
capital gain dividends she will exempt. Alternatively, the law could
designate that the earliest capital gain dividends soaked up the exemption.
Or, it could require the mutual fund shareholder to divide the exemption
pro rata among the capital gain dividends she received during the year.
While any of these three methods would work, dividing the exemption
pro rata among the dividends is the best solution. Elective taxation is, at
best, problematic. When confronted with a tax election, a taxpayer must
spend time evaluating her options, determine how to make the election, and
actually fulfill the steps to make the election.207 The steps necessary to
make an election increase the administrative burden on the taxpayer (and,
for that matter, on the I.R.S., which must process and police the
elections).2 08 In addition to the administrative burden, a taxpayer must
either spend time evaluating the consequences of the election herself or pay
somebody else to evaluate it on her behalf.209 The costs of tax planning and
tax advice constitute dead-weight loss. 2 10 Moreover, because mutual fund
shares are often held by unsophisticated investors, the administrative costs
of making the election would presumably be steeper and more difficult to
navigate than elections aimed at sophisticated taxpayers.
In addition to the efficiency costs of electivity, because taxpayers will
generally elect tax treatment that reduces their overall tax liability, any tax
election will reduce government revenue. 2 11 In the case of mutual funds,
allowing shareholders to choose which capital gain dividends they will
exclude from their income raises real concerns about government revenue.
Presumably, if shareholders can choose which mutual fund dividends to
exclude from their income, they will elect those shares that they do not plan
on selling. Because of the realization requirement of the tax law, as long as
shareholders do not sell the shares they received as a dividend, they will
continue to defer taxes on their gain. By electing to exclude shares that she
did not plan on selling, a shareholder could potentially eliminate taxes on
those shares altogether; if she held them until her death, she could eliminate
the taxation of the excluded gain.

See Heather M. Field, Choosing Tax. Explicit Elections as an Element of Design in the
207.
FederalIncome Tax System, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 21, 27-28 (2010).
208.
Id. at 29 ("This complexity for taxpayers is often mirrored by the administrative burden
placed on the IRS.").
209.
Id. at 30.
210.
Edward J. McCaffery, The Holy Grailof Tax Simplification, 1990 Wis. L. REV. 1267, 1297
(1990) ("There are, for example, the costs of tax advice and preparation, that can be considered as dead
weight losses. The loss becomes especially costly if the provisions do not add to equity or efficiency.")
(internal footnote omitted).
211.
Field,supra note 207, at 31 ("[A] well-advised rational taxpayer will almost always exercise
the election in a way that minimizes its tax liability, at the expense of the fisc.") (internal footnotes
omitted).
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Applying the exclusion to capital gain dividends in the order of receipt
could also create wasteful distortions. To the extent that a mutual fund
wanted a portion of its dividends to be excluded, it would have an incentive
to pay dividends as early in the year as possible, whether or not it would
have declared dividends at that point. On the other hand, if a mutual fund
did not want its dividends excluded, this tax rule would push its dividends
toward the end of the year.
While
taxes
inevitably
distort
a
taxpayer's
economic
decisionmaking,2 12 applying the exemption to a shareholder's mutual fund
dividends in a pro rata manner limits the distortive effect of the proposed
regime. Because the tax treatment of capital gain dividends does not
depend on the dividends' timing, mutual funds will choose when to declare
and pay their dividends based on economic and business factors. Because
shareholders cannot decide which dividends they will exclude from their
income, they will not face the administrative burden of determining the
most favorable dividends to exclude. True, they will need to calculate how
much of each dividend they can exclude from their income, but that
calculation is a simple mathematical one and does not require extraordinary
analysis. As a result, mutual fund shareholders should apply the 10%
exemption pro rata to the capital gain dividends they receive during the
course of the year.
2. DeterminingBasis
After a shareholder receives her additional shares and determines
which shares are exempt from tax, she must determine her basis in the
shares. The problem of assigning basis to shares received as part of a
dividend reinvestment plan is not unique to this proposal. Current law
already permits mutual fund shareholders to participate in dividend
reinvestment plans, receiving distributions of additional shares of the
mutual fund rather than cash.213 Though shareholders pay taxes on the full
value of the shares they receive, that value may differ from the cost of other
shares they received pursuant to the dividend reinvestment plan and from
the amount they paid for their initial investment. As such, a mutual fund
shareholder who elects to participate in a dividend reinvestment plan may
own several blocks of mutual fund shares, each potentially with a different
basis.

212.
See Martin Feldstein, The Welfare Cost of CapitalIncome Taxation, 86 J. POL. ECON. S29,
S32 (1978) ("Since the individual consumes three distinct 'goods' (i.e., leisure, first-period
consumption, and second-period consumption), any tax (other than a lump-sum tax) will impose at least
one distorting wedge.").
213.
See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
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Current law provides for two general methods of determining basis for
mutual fund shares purchased in different blocks. Under one method, each
block of stock has a separate basis. When a shareholder acquires additional
stock in a dividend, she pays taxes on the value of the dividend and takes a
basis of the value of the stock received.214 Alternatively, a mutual fund
shareholder may elect to use the "average basis method" to determine her
basis in her mutual fund shares.2 15 Under the average basis method, a
mutual fund shareholder looks at all of her shares of the same mutual fund
that she has acquired pursuant to a dividend reinvestment plan.2 16 She then
calculates the basis of each share of stock by adding the bases of all of such
shares and dividing by the number of shares.2 17
The regulations illustrate this rule using a mutual fund shareholder
who, pursuant to a dividend reinvestment plan, periodically receives
additional shares of the L Company, a mutual fund. On January 8, 2010,
she receives a $200 dividend, paid in the form of twenty-five shares of L
Company. On February 8, 2010, she receives a $200 dividend paid as
twenty-four shares. On March 8, 2010, she receives a $200 dividend paid in
twenty shares, and on April 8, 2010, she receives a $200 dividend paid in
twenty shares.218 As a result of her dividend reinvestment plan, the
shareholder has eighty-nine shares of L Company. 219 Her aggregate basis in
all of the shares is $800.220 Thus, using the average basis method, she has a
basis of $8.99 in each share of L Company.22 '
Under current law a mutual fund shareholder determines her basis in
accordance with her broker's default method.2 22 If her broker determines
basis for each block of shares separately and she does not want to use that
method, she can elect to use the average basis method instead.223 Providing
two methods for calculating basis unnecessarily increases complexity,
though. Instead, the law should require shareholders to use the average
basis method. Requiring all mutual fund shareholders to calculate their
basis using a single method will reduce the administrative burden for
taxpayers and for the I.R.S. Moreover, using the average basis method
simplifies shareholders' calculation of gain when they redeem their
224
At the bare minimum, the average basis method should be the
shares.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

See I.R.C. § 6045(g)(2)(B)(i)(I) (2006).
Id. § 6045(g)(2)(B)(i)(II).
Treas. Reg. § 1.1012-1(e)(7)(i) (amended 2010).
Id.
Id. § 1.1012-1(e)(7)(vi) Ex. 2.
25 + 24 + 20 + 20 89.
$200 + $200 + $200 + $200 = $800.
Treas. Reg. § 1.1012-1(e)(7)(vi) Ex. 2.
I.R.C. § 6045(g)(2)(B)(i)(II) (2006).
Id.
See infra Part I.E.

178

Alabama Law Review

[Vol. 65:1:139

default, and taxpayers who would rather use block accounting should be
required to make an affirmative election to do so.
3. Determining Gain or Loss
When a mutual fund shareholder wants to convert her investment to
cash, she can do so in one of two principal ways. If she owns shares of a
closed-end mutual fund, she sells them to another investor on the open
market.225 She will realize gain or loss on the sale by subtracting her basis
in the shares from the amount she realizes on the sale.226 By contrast, if she
owns an open-end mutual fund-by far the most common type of mutual
fund 2 27-she does not sell her shares on the open market. Instead, the fund
stands ready to redeem her shares at their net asset value.228 Though an
open-end mutual fund's redemption of shares differs from the sale of a
closed-end fund's shares on a securities market, the tax law nonetheless
treats a corporate redemption as a sale of the stock. 2 29 As with closed-end
funds, a shareholder of an open-end fund has a taxable gain or loss equal to
the difference between the redemption amount and her basis in the stock.230
The allocation of the exempt capital gain dividends and the
determination of basis are clearly necessary elements of determining a
selling or redeeming shareholder's taxable gain. But even with those two
issues decided, the sale or redemption raises additional issues that must be
resolved. Because, unless a mutual fund shareholder sells or redeems all of
her shares in a mutual fund, she must determine which shares she sells.2 3 1
225.
ICI FACT BOOK, supra note 5, at 58. As a result, shareholders in closed-end funds do not
face forced realization income; because the fund does not redeem shareholders, it does not need to sell
assets to fund redemptions. However, with $239 billion of assets under management, closed-end funds
manage less than 2% of the assets managed by traditional mutual funds. See id. Because the tax law
currently does not differentiate between open-end and closed-end funds and because closed-end funds
represent such a small slice of the investment landscape, there is no compelling reason to differentiate
between them for purposes of the dividend exclusion.
226.
I.R.C. § 1001(a).
227.
Illig, supra note 70, at 294 ("Open-end mutual funds [are] the most popular and common of
mutual funds. . . ."). At the end of 2011, open-end mutual funds had approximately $11.6 trillion under
management, ICI FACT BOOK, supra note 5, at 134, while closed-end funds had net assets of about
$239 billion. Id. at 144.
228.
See Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and
Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1049-50 (2007) ("Open-end mutual funds, by definition
and by statute, must also stand ready to redeem their shares at the request of any shareholder at short
notice. The redemption price of these shares is based on the fund's net asset value.") (internal footnote
omitted).
229.
1.R.C. § 302(a).
230.
Id. § 1001(a).
231.
The importance of determining which shares she sells is most acute where a shareholder
does not use the average basis method. In that case, some of her shares will have a higher basis than
others. If she sells less than all of her shares, the amount of taxable gain she recognizes will depend on
which shares she sells. If she sells high-basis shares, she will realize less gain than she would if she sold
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Determining which shares she sells has a profound impact on the
mutual fund shareholder's economic well-being. The tax law should not
permit shareholders to elect which shares they sell or redeem. True, such an
election would not distort a taxpayer's choices. As long as all three shares
are identical, a shareholder has no non-tax reason to prefer to redeem share
one or share three. But because there is no economic or business
consequence to the choice, such an election would always cost the
government revenue. The shareholder would always elect to sell or redeem
her highest-basis shares first, deferring gain and depriving the government
ofrevenue.232
In general, when a taxpayer holds fungible property (such as common
stock in the same mutual fund) with differing bases or holding period and
she sells less than all of the property, the tax law uses one of two
accounting methods to identify which property a taxpayer sells. First-in,
first-out ("FIFO") accounting treats a taxpayer as if she sells identical
property in the same order she acquired it.2 3 3 Last-in, first-out ("LIFO")
accounting, on the other hand, reverses the order, treating a taxpayer as if
she sold the most recent property she acquired first.234
Under current law, mutual fund shareholders must generally determine
their bases and holding periods using FIFO accounting. 235 There is no
reason to change that rule for purposes of the 10% exemption. FIFO
accounting would prevent taxpayers from electively reducing government

her low-basis shares. For example, imagine Miles wants to redeem one share of X Mutual Fund, which
has a current net asset value of $75. He owns three identical shares, one with a basis of $0, one with a
basis of $25, and one with a basis of $50. In a world without tax, he does not care which share he
redeems; he will have $75 cash after his redemption.
In a world that taxes gains, however, that indifference evaporates. Imagine that Miles will pay taxes on
his realized gains at a 15 percent rate. If he sells the zero-basis share, he will have $75 of taxable
income, will owe taxes of $11.25, and will be left with $63.75 after taxes. If he sells his shares with a
basis of $25, he will have $50 of taxable income, will owe $7.50 in taxes, and will have $67.50 after
taxes. If he sells his share with a $50 basis, he will only have $25 of taxable income, on which he will
owe $3.75 in taxes. After taxes, he will keep $71.25.
232.
Note that if Miles used the average basis method, he would have less ability to reduce his tax
liability by choosing to redeem high-basis shares. Even with the average basis method, though, he could
have a different basis in shares he purchased and shares he received through a dividend reinvestment
plan. To the extent those bases differed, he would always elect to redeem or sell his high-basis shares,
of course, because selling the high-basis shares minimizes gain, if any, and maximizes losses, if any.
233.
Edward A. Morse, Demystifying LIFO: Towards Simplification of Inflation-Adjusted
Inventory Valuation, 2 FLA. TAX REv. 559, 563 (1995) ("[T]he first goods purchased or produced
during the year are deemed to be the first goods sold, and the ending inventory is composed of the last
goods purchased or produced during the current taxable year.").
234.
Id. ("LIFO reverses the FIFO assumption. Inventory on hand at the close of the taxable year
is comprised first of those items on hand in the beginning inventory and then, to the extent of any
excess, items acquired during the taxable year.").
235.
Treas. Reg. § 1.1012-1(c)(1) (amended 2010).
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revenue while, at the same time, treating taxpayers favorably on their
*236
gain.
D. Phaseout
In addition to the technical aspects of the exemption-its 10% limit, its
application of the average basis method, and its use of FIFO accountingthe exemption needs to phase out for taxpayers above a certain income
level. Phaseouts reduce a tax benefit as a taxpayer's income increases.237
The tax law currently contains nearly twenty phaseout provisions, which
affect as many as one-quarter of all taxpayers.238
In general, lawmakers should use phaseouts cautiously. Phaseouts
increase the tax law's complexity, increasing the administrative burden
taxpayers face in complying with their tax obligations.239 Moreover,
because they make it difficult for a taxpayer to know her tax liability for
the year in advance, phaseouts make tax planning and compliance more
difficult. 240
Notwithstanding these problems, though, phaseouts can provide certain
benefits. They increase a provision's vertical equity. 24 1 The purpose behind
The average basis method proposed in this Article would appear to limit the ability of
236.
mutual fund shareholders to electively reduce their tax bill. Using the average basis method, all of the
shares she received pursuant to her dividend reinvestment plan would have an identical basis, and
therefore, her tax liability would be the same irrespective of which share she sold. Still, the average
basis method does not equalize the basis of all of a mutual fund shareholder's shares; it applies only to
those shares she receives pursuant to a dividend reinvestment plan, not to shares she purchases on the
open market. See supra note 216 and accompanying text. Her basis in purchased shares could,
therefore, differ from her average basis in her other shares. Because her shares are all fungible, though,
she faces no non-tax economic consequence to determining which shares she sells. If she could elect
which shares she sold, she would, therefore, elect to sell the higher-basis shares. Without any non-tax
friction stopping her from this type of tax planning, the tax law should prevent this planning
opportunity.
At the same time, if the tax law treats a mutual fund shareholder as selling the oldest shares she holds
first, it is easier for her to establish a holding period of more than one year in at least some of her
redeemed shares. This holding period provides that, upon redemption, she will realize long-term capital
gain, taxed at preferential rates. I.R.C. §§ 1(h)(1)(C), 1222(3) (2006). If, on the other hand, it treats her
as selling her most recently acquired stock first, to avoid being taxed at ordinary rates, she would have
to wait until more than one year after she received her last reinvested dividend to sell. Otherwise, every
time she received a dividend pursuant to her dividend reinvestment plan, she would reset the clock on at
least a portion of her distribution.
Charles S. Hartman, Missed It by That Much-Phase-outProvisions in the Internal Revenue
237.
Code, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 187, 188 (1996).
238.
Samuel A. Donaldson, The Easy Case Against Tax Simplification, 22 VA. TAX REV. 645,
722-23 (2003).
239.
2 JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 107TH CONG., STUDY OF THE OVERALL STATE OF THE FEDERAL
TAX SYSTEM AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SIMPLIFICATION, PURSUANT TO SECTION 8022(3)(B) OF
THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1986 87 (Comm. Print 2001).

Id. at 88.
240.
Donaldson, supra note 238, at 724 ("Policymakers design phaseouts to enhance vertical
241.
equity.").
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the exemption of capital gain dividends is to eliminate the tax
disadvantages of mutual fund investments, largely owned by low- and
middle-income taxpayers, as compared with direct portfolio investments
and investments in private investment funds, almost entirely owned by
high-income taxpayers. With no phaseout in the exemption, though, highincome taxpayers could benefit from both the improved tax position of
mutual funds and direct investments in securities and private investment
funds. Wealthy investors would still have a tax advantage over lowerincome investors.
In addition, phaseouts "reduce the revenue loss from a tax benefit
because the benefit is limited to lower-income taxpayers, thus increasing
the efficiency of the federal income tax." 2 42 Although this exemption has a
relatively low tax cost, introducing a phaseout will further reduce the cost
of its enactment. 243 The lower cost may make the provision more
politically palatable.
The implementation of phaseout provisions generally falls into one of
two categories: it can reduce tax benefits by a constant rate over a specified
income range or it can reduce benefits by a specified amount for each
additional increment of income.244 The credit for adoption expenses, for
example, phases out at a constant rate-under the Code, for every $100 of
adjusted gross income in excess of $150,000, a taxpayer must reduce her
credit by 0.25%.245 The credit phases out entirely at $190,000 of adjusted
gross income. 246 The deduction for qualified tuition, on the other hand, is
reduced by a specified amount for each additional increment of income.
For years beginning after 2003, a single taxpayer can deduct $4,000 if her
adjusted gross income does not exceed $65,000.247 The available deduction
drops to $2,000 if her adjusted gross income is more than $65,000, but not
more than $80,000, and drops to $0 if her adjusted gross income exceeds
$80,000.248
In this second type of phaseout, it does not matter if the taxpayer's
adjusted gross income exceeds $65,000 by $1 or by $25,000: either way,
she loses half of her tax benefit. For the purposes of the dividend exception,
phasing out the benefit at a constant rate appears preferable. Because the
exclusion phases out at a constant rate, taxpayers do not face a cliff effect,
242.
Id. at 725.
243.
See supranote 154 and accompanying text.
244.
Roberton Williams, How Do Phaseouts of Tax Provisions Affect Taxpayers?, in THE TAX
POLICY BRIEFING BOOK: A CfTIZENS' GUIDE FOR THE 2012 ELECTION AND BEYOND, at 1-7-6 (2011),
available at http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/TPC briefingbook-full.pdf.
245.
I.R.C. § 23(b)(2)(A) (2006).
246.
Id. The credit is indexed for inflation so, in practice, these numbers will be slightly different,
but the concept is the same. Id. § 23(h).
247.
Id. §222(b)(2)(B)(i).
248.
Id. §222(b)(2)(B)(ii)-(iii).
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where one additional dollar of income causes their taxes to increase by
more than one dollar. Thus, a constant-rate phaseout introduces fewer
distortions into a taxpayer's calculation about whether to earn an additional
dollar of income.
The next step after determining that the phaseout of the capital gain
dividend exemption should use a constant-rate phaseout is to determine the
threshold amounts for where the phaseout begins and ends. The purpose of
the exemption is to reduce the tax disadvantages of mutual funds so that
low- and middle-income households do not face higher rates of tax on their
investments than wealthy individuals. As such, the phaseout needs to be
high enough that it does not affect these households. At the same time, it
should be low enough that wealthy households cannot benefit from
additional tax advantages.
No clear line separates a middle-class income from a high income.249
Still, data about relative incomes can help design fair thresholds for the
phaseout to begin and end. According to the I.R.S.'s data the top 10% of
2008 tax returns showed an adjusted gross income of at least $113,799, the
top 5% showed an adjusted gross income of at least $159,619, and the top
1% showed an adjusted gross income of at least $380,354.250 While any of
these numbers could provide a starting point for the phaseout, I recommend
that for joint filers the exemption begin to phase out at $300,000 and that it
phase out completely at $350,000.251 Moreover, the phaseout should be
indexed to inflation so that it does not start creeping down and disallowing
the exemption for middle-class shareholders.
With the phaseout set at these levels, more than 99% of taxpayers can
enjoy the full exemption, while the exemption will not be available to those
whose income puts them above the top 1% of income earners, inarguably
one legitimate dividing line between the middle-class and the wealthy. This
will increase the vertical equity of the exemption, improving the tax
249.
See, e.g., Catherine Rampell, Who Counts As 'Rich'?, ECONOMIX (Dec. 9, 2011, 2:40 PM),
http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/12/09/who-counts-as-rich/ (discussing various views of what
it means to be rich).
250.
Kyle Mudry, Individual Income Tax Rates and Shares, 2008, STATISTICS OF INCOME
BULLETIN 22, 62 (Winter 2011). The Tax Policy Center has done a finer-grained calculation of income

percentages. According to its numbers, in 2011, a married couple filing jointly needed to have "cash
income" of at least $298,736 to make it into the 95th percentile, while unmarried taxpayers needed
$87,149, and the 95th percentile for all tax units began at $200,026. Tax Policy Ctr., Income Breaks,
2011, TAX POLICY CENTER (MAY 12, 2011), http://taxpolicycenter.org/numbers/displayatab.cfm?
DoclD=2970 (Sept. 30, 2013). The Tax Policy Center's "cash income" differs significantly from
adjusted gross income, though, by adding back deductions and adding in nontaxable income, including
tax-exempt interest and payroll taxes paid by a taxpayer's employer. Tax Policy Ctr., Income Breaksfor
Distribution Tables, 2004-2022, TAX POLICY CENTER (Mar. 18, 2004), http://taxpolicycenter.org/
numbers/displayatab.cfm?DoclD=574 (last visited Sept. 30, 2013). As such, even though its data is
more specific, the Tax Policy Center's numbers are less helpful in determining an appropriate phaseout.
251.
For single individuals, the phaseout should begin at about $250,000 of income. Cf infra
notes 252-253 (both phaseouts begin at $250,000 for single taxpayers).
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situation of low- and middle-income taxpayers while requiring those who
can pay more taxes to do so.
In addition to the phaseout's roughly corresponding to the line between
the top 1% of income earners and the bottom 99%, starting to phase the
exemption out at $350,000 tracks two other phaseout provisions intended to
provide benefits to low- and medium-income taxpayers, but not to highincome taxpayers. In 2013, joint filers' ability to deduct their personal
exemption amounts phases out between $300,000 and $422,500.252 In
addition, a joint filer's ability to use itemized deductions begins to phase
out when she reaches $300,000 of income.253 Both phaseouts apply to highincome taxpayers, and both start at income levels close to that proposed in
this Article. These phaseouts provide additional support for beginning the
phaseout at $300,000.
E. Illustratingthe Exemption
The combination of assigning basis using the average basis method and
requiring shareholders to use FIFO accounting upon the redemption of
shares benefits both the government (by preventing tax planning) and the
shareholder (by permitting her to maximize the amount of her income that
consists of long-term capital gain). The benefits of the rules proposed in
this Article can be illustrated with an example.
Mary files a joint return with her husband; in 2012 and 2013, they had
a combined taxable income of $75,000.254 Assume that Mary purchased 10
shares of Y Mutual Fund on January 1, 2012, for $100 per share. On
December 1, 2012, the fund paid Mary a $180 dividend, of which it
designated $80 as capital gain dividends. Pursuant to Mary's dividend
reinvestment plan, she received the dividend in the form of an additional
three shares of Y Mutual Fund. On February 1, 2013, Y Mutual Fund paid
an additional $220 dividend, $120 of which it designated as capital gain
dividends, and which Mary received in the form of an additional two shares
of Y Mutual Fund. On February 28, 2013, Y Mutual Fund redeemed 11 of
Mary's shares for $110 per share.
Under the capital gain dividend exemption, assuming that her income
did not exceed the phaseout threshold, Mary could exempt $8 of the
December 1 dividend and $12 of the February 1 dividend from her income.
As a result, she would pay taxes on $172 of her mutual fund dividends in
2012 and on $208 in 2013.

252.
Rev. Proc. 2013-15 § 2.11(2), 2013-5 I.R.B. 444.
253.
Id. § 2.08.
254.
With a joint income of $75,000, the phaseout would not apply. In 2013, Mary and her
husband would pay taxes at a marginal rate of 25%. Id. § 2.01.
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Under the average basis method, Mary would have two blocks of stock.
She would have a basis of $100 per share in the shares she purchased. Her
basis in shares acquired pursuant to her dividend reinvestment plan would
initially be $60 per share. 255 But as of February 1, 2013, her basis in her
unpurchased shares changes: now, she has a basis of $80 in each of the five
shares she received pursuant to the dividend reinvestment plan.256
Because she determines which shares she redeemed using FIFO
accounting, the tax law treats Mary as if she redeemed the ten shares she
purchased, as well as one share she received as a dividend. Because she has
held her purchase shares for longer than a year, her $100 of gain on her
purchased shares qualifies as long-term capital gain, taxable at a 15% rate.
Her $30 gain on the share she received as a dividend, however, will not
qualify as long-term capital gain, and she will pay taxes on that gain at her
ordinary rate. As a result, Mary owes $22.50 in taxes on the proceeds of her
redemption.257
V. CONCLUSION

This Article joins a surprisingly small chorus calling for the reform of
mutual fund tax rules. Rather than explore the whole world of those rules,
though, it focuses on a single inequity found in the rules: the taxation of
mutual fund shareholders on forced realization income.
Forced realization income exists as a result of the combination of
mutual funds' obligation to redeem shareholders on demand and the
requirement that they distribute substantially all of their capital gains.
These two requirements, separately, cause mutual funds to approximate
direct investments, but as a result of their interaction, mutual fund investors
face additional tax costs that rich investors can avoid. These costs may be
the inevitable result of designing a quasi-pass-through entity like a mutual
fund, but no tax policy justifies the additional expense. In fact, vertical
equity considerations argue against mutual fund investors facing a higher
tax burden than wealthier investors who can afford to assemble a
diversified portfolio or invest in hedge funds or private equity funds.
Moreover, although the additional tax costs may be inevitable, they can
be ameliorated within the basic framework of the existing rules. This
Article proposes a specific reform-the exemption of up to 10% of the
capital gain dividends from mutual fund shareholders' income-that would
255.
A $180 dividend divided among the three shares Mary received gives her a basis of $60 per
share.
256.
That is, she has a basis of $180 from the first set of reinvested shares plus $220 from the
second set. Mary must then divide that $400 of basis between the five shares she received pursuant to
her reinvestment plan.
257.
($100 x 15%) + ($30 x 25%) = $22.50.
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largely ameliorate the problem of forced realization income. And even
unsophisticated taxpayers could understand and comply with the
requirements.
This administrability admittedly comes at the cost of precision. For
some investors, the exemption will exceed the actual forced realization
income they receive from their mutual funds. While for others, it may
understate their forced realization income. Nonetheless, even where it
understates the forced realization income, the exemption at least reduces
the tax consequences to shareholders, and it is an affordable reform.
Mutual funds are such an important investment vehicle that other
aspects of their taxation merit further consideration. But providing this
exemption would be a significant step in the direction of making available
to poor and middle-class Americans a fair and equitable vehicle for
investment and reducing the difference between the rich and the rest of us.

